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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRUE TO CHARACTER: HONORING THE INTELLECTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS

ANDREW KING-RIES*

I. INTRODUCTION
The law has condoned domestic violence1 in America since the formation
of the country. Two hundred and thirty years of the American experiment
have witnessed three different phases of the legal system’s condoning of
domestic violence. During the early years of the United States, the common
law expressly permitted violence against women.2 This prerogative ended
around the middle of the nineteenth century when states rejected the rule of
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Montana University School of Law; B.A. in History 1988,
Brown University; J.D. 1993, Washington University in St. Louis. I am indebted to my
colleagues, Tom Huff, Bari Burke, and J. Martin Burke for their invaluable assistance and
insightful comments. I also want to thank Melissa Hartigan and Monte Jewell for compelling
conversation and assistance. My thanks also to Wayne Capp, who did wonderful work as my
research assistant. For Kristin King-Ries, I am so grateful for her constant support, enthusiasm,
and assistance. Lastly, I am forever indebted to the domestic violence victims who shared their
stories with me in my eight years with the King County Prosecutors Office.
1. Throughout this article, I refer to violence between intimate partners as domestic
violence. For an interesting discussion of alternative terminology, see CLARE DALTON &
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (2001). By “domestic
violence,” I intend a pattern of violence by one partner for the purpose of exerting power and
control over the other. See infra text accompanying notes 65-116 for more complete discussion.
The establishment of such a pattern of violent behavior creates a “battering relationship.”
Importantly, not all violence within an intimate relationship establishes a battering relationship.
For the purposes of this paper, I am concerned about the admissibility of character evidence of a
battering relationship, not simply violence within an intimate relationship. Although there are
interesting parallels, for the purposes of this paper, I am excluding child abuse.
2. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self
Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 627-30 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights].
While batterers are overwhelmingly heterosexual males, battering relationships are not limited to
heterosexuals. I specifically use the gender-neutral terms “domestic violence” and “battering
relationship” to recognize that violence and battering occurs within homosexual relationships and
can be perpetrated on males. That said, however, because statistics demonstrate that nearly 95%
of domestic violence victims are women, I will also employ gender-specific language throughout
this paper. See infra note 129. While the day may come when domestic violence will be less
strongly related to gender, now is not that day.
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chastisement.3 Interestingly, legal prohibition has not impacted the prevalence
of domestic violence. Domestic violence remains the leading cause of injury
to women every year.4 This fact stems from the two more subtle periods of
legal sanction of domestic violence. From the 1850s until the 1970s, the law
reinforced a public-private dichotomy, assigned violence against women to the
private sphere, and then refused to intervene in the private sphere.5 This phase
of tacit sanction of domestic violence through non-intervention into the private
realm lessened after the 1970s due to the impact of public recognition.6 This
impact, however, has been significantly negated by the operation of the
character evidence ban. The character evidence ban has taken the place of the
rule of chastisement and non-intervention into the private sphere to perpetuate
the legal sanction of domestic violence.
In general, the character evidence ban precludes the admission of evidence
of the defendant’s prior bad acts; its purpose is to isolate the charged incident
from the defendant’s past so the jury can assess the validity of the charged
incident unencumbered by other behavior. Domestic violence, by its very
nature, is not an isolated incident, but rather a pattern of behavior designed to
exert power and control over another person.7 Inherent in domestic violence is
repetitive conduct.8 Given the repetitive nature of battering relationships, the
3. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
4. Benjamin Z. Rice, A Voice from People v. Simpson: Reconsidering the Propensity Rule
in Spousal Homicide Cases, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (1996). “Violence is now leading
cause of injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years.” Id. (citing Antonio C. Novello, From the
Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service: A Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267
JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992)).
5. Katherine Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Rationales for
Spousal Battering, Marital Rape, and Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 91-92, 94 (1994).
6. See id. at 94-96, 102-07.
7. Debra Raye Hayes Ogden, Prosecuting Domestic Violence Crimes: Effectively Using
Rule 404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountable for Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 361, 362
(1998/99). “Domestic violence is not an isolated event. One battering episode builds on past
episodes and sets the stage for future episodes . . . . The incidents have one thing in common: the
abuse is directed at controlling the intimate partner.” Id. See infra notes 84-95 and
accompanying text.
8. Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and
Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1468 (1996) (discussing studies indicating that 90% of women
murdered by their batterers had previously called the police). See also Robert A. Guy, Jr., The
Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 VAND. L. REV. 991, 996 (1993). Additionally,
studies have also found that 50% of murdered domestic violence victims had called police five or
more times prior to their deaths. Raeder, supra, at 1468 n.22. Finally, a 1991 study found that
“about one in five women victimized by a husband or former husband reported that they had been
the victim of a series of similar crimes, with at least three assaults in the last six months, so
similar that they could not remember them distinctly.” Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap
Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 359, 389 (1996).
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ban on prior bad act evidence is at issue in nearly every domestic violence
prosecution. Because nearly four million American women are battered every
year,9 the effect of the character evidence ban in the domestic violence context
is significant. No other evidence rule goes to the heart of a crime the way that
the character evidence ban does with domestic violence. The character
evidence ban prevents the true nature of domestic violence from exposure to
public scrutiny and, therefore, sanctions and perpetuates domestic violence.
This article calls for a new rule allowing the admission of prior acts of
abuse within the context of a current domestic violence prosecution. Articles
dealing with domestic violence that advocate a change in the law typically
begin with a horrible fact pattern.10 Indeed, the use of such undeniably
horrible stories reveals the emotional power of domestic violence and often
compels the reader toward a particular viewpoint. Generally, such narratives
are followed by arguments which flow as follows: domestic violence is a
societal epidemic; domestic violence prosecutions are difficult; the particular
rule change will make it easier to prosecute domestic violence perpetrators;
more successful prosecution will reduce the societal epidemic of domestic
violence; therefore, the law should be changed.11
9. Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, in NANCY K.D.
LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW 11, 15 (2001). Statistics on the number of women who
experience domestic violence range widely, mainly due to differences in methodology. In 2000,
the National Institute of Justice estimated that 1.3 million women are victimized every year by
intimate partners. PATRICIA TJADEN AND NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REP. NCJ183781, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, & CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 26 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. This
study was limited to women over the age of 18 who lived in a house with a telephone. The study,
therefore, excludes juveniles, homeless women, and women isolated by poverty or the batterer’s
design. Albert Roberts, Spousal and Partner Abuse, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 207, 209 (Ronald Gottesman & Richard Maxwell Brown, eds., 1999). It has
been estimated that a man beats a woman every twelve seconds in the United States, and thirty to
fifty percent of the women murdered in the United States die at the hands of the intimate male
partners. Rice, supra note 4, at 940; see also Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under Seige: Do
Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 525 (1993);
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, REP. NCJ-167237, VIOLENCE BY
INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS,
AND GIRLFRIENDS 5 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. For an
interesting discussion about analyzing domestic violence data, see UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 7-48 (Nancy A. Cromwell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996).
10. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 363-65; Sarah J. Lee, The Search for the Truth:
Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 22122 (1998); Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a
New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 973
(2000).
11. See Lee, supra note 10, at 253-59. See also De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 397-400;
Letendre, supra note 10, at 996-1003.
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This article, by contrast, seeks to ground the need to change the character
evidence ban for domestic violence prosecutions in reasons that have nothing
to do with making the prosecution easier. Historically, changes that make
prosecution of particular types of cases easier are morally suspect and tend to
reflect the will of powerful majorities as opposed to proper advances in the
law. The difficulty lies in the fact that rules, protections, and civil liberties are
jettisoned in order to combat a specific evil, yet the reasons for that tactic are
not connected to the traditional rationale supporting the rules, protections, and
civil liberties.12
This article proposes a specific evidence rule in the domestic violence
context which would admit evidence of the defendant’s character as it relates
to battering and would allow that evidence to be used substantively in a
prosecution for domestic violence. The argument here grounds the need for a
new rule regarding admissibility of prior bad acts in domestic violence cases in
the very rationale which supports the general ban on character evidence. It is
the position of this paper that the rationale supporting the current rule actually
calls for a rule change in the domestic violence context and supports such a
change, thereby preserving the ideals behind the original rule.
This article will proceed in the following fashion. Section II will discuss
the history of domestic violence in America. That section will explore the
three ways that the law has condoned domestic violence: express sanction
through the rule of chastisement, tacit sanction through non-intervention in the
private sphere, and implicit sanction through the effect of the character
evidence rule. Section III will examine the intellectual background of the
character evidence ban. Specifically, that section will identify how the
character evidence ban embodies major developments in intellectual history
prior to, and during, the creation of the American Republic: the rejection of
virtue ethics, the Reformation, the development of the liberal state, the rise of
modern science, the Enlightenment, and the breakdown of social stratification.
Section III will then explore the conflict between the character evidence rule
and the law’s recognition of domestic violence. In addition, Section III will
demonstrate how the character evidence ban violates its underlying principles
in the domestic violence context. That section will also articulate rationale for
a new character evidence rule in the domestic violence context – a rule
consistent with the rule’s original intellectual underpinnings.

12. Unfortunately, this phenomenon can be seen clearly in the government’s response to
terrorism.
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II. THE HISTORY OF LEGAL SANCTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A.

The Rule of Chastisement

American common law largely derived from English law, which fully
recognized the right of men to engage in violence against their wives.13 Ten
years prior to the American Revolution, William Blackstone published his
Commentaries on the Laws of England.14 This work had significant impact on
the development of American laws relating to domestic violence.15 Blackstone
articulated the common law rule which authorized a husband to beat his wife
with either “moderate chastisement” or “severely with scourges and
cudgels.”16
According to Blackstone, the rule of chastisement stemmed directly from
the inferior legal status of women upon marriage.17 Under English and
American common law, married women had no legal status.18 The complete
legal subjugation of women was primarily accomplished through two
doctrines: coverture and unities.19 According to the doctrine of coverture, the
wife was under the protection, or cover, of the husband.20 The second and
related doctrine was the theory of unities.21 According to Blackstone, “By
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.”22 Married women
could not own real or personal property, enter into a contract, sue or be sued,
13. Virginia H. Murray, A Comparative Study of the Historic Civil, Common, and American
Indian Tribal Law Responses to Domestic Violence, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 433, 442 (1998);
Schelong, supra note 5, at 90. Schelong identifies that the roots of state sanctioned domestic
violence can be traced back to Roman law. Roman law allowed men to beat their wives, even to
death, for offenses that impugned their honor or property. Id. at 84. See also Rice, supra note 4,
at 940; Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 627-30.
14. Dennis Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 731, 735 (1976).
15. Murray, supra note 13, at 442; Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as
Prerogative, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2124 n.21 (1996) (discussing the importance and the impact of
Blackstone’s commentaries on American law, lawyers, and development of domestic violence
law). For a general discussion of Blackstone’s influence on American law, see Nolan, supra note
14.
16. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444-45.
17. Schelong, supra note 5, at 86-87.
18. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321, 326 (1997). See also Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort
Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 361-65 (1989).
19. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 (2000).
20. Dalton, supra note 18, at 326.
21. Id.
22. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *442.
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make a will, deny a husband’s sexual advances, or testify in a court of law,
especially against her husband.23
According to Blackstone, the husband’s right to beat his wife was the
result of women having no legal identity upon marriage:
For, as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to
intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the
same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or
children . . . .24

The right of correction granted the husband, and father, the right to use
physical violence, including a rod or whip, against his wife, children, servants,
and apprentices.25 Prior to being imported into the United States, the English
right to chastisement had two limitations. First, the husband could not inflict
death or serious permanent disfigurement.26 Second, the rule of thumb limited
the size of the stick with which the husband could beat his wife to one smaller
than the width of his thumb.27 Importantly, the right of correction, although
intellectually separate from abuse, justified nearly all forms of assault by
parents and husbands so long as it did not cause permanent injury.28
The right to chastise a wife became part of the American common law
during the colonial period and continued in many states well past the Civil
War. As early as 1681, courts throughout the country expressly acknowledged
the existence of the English rule of chastisement.29 Importantly, in each case,
23. Schelong, supra note 5, at 86. See Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t it a Crime: Feminist
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1047-52
(1996) (discussing origins of spousal immunity); Siegel, supra note 15, at 2153 n.132.
24. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *444. See also Dalton, supra note 18, at 326.
According to some commentators, the right of chastisement or “correction” that Blackstone
acknowledged originally derived from the Christian church in the 14th Century Rules of
Marriage:
When you see your wife commit an offense, don’t rush at her with insults and violent
blows . . . . Scold her sharply, bully and terrify her. And if this still doesn’t work . . . take
up a stick and beat her soundly, for it is better to punish the body and correct the soul than
to damage the soul and spare the body . . . . Then readily beat her, not in rage but out of
charity and concern for her soul, so that the beating will redound to your merit and her
good.
Schelong, supra note 5, at 85; see also Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A
Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 153 n.69 (1995).
25. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 8-9 (1987).
26. Id. at 9.
27. Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 241 (1917).
28. PLECK, supra note 25, at 9.
29. Stedman, supra note 27, at 243-46. The earliest reported case appears to be Bread’s
Case, 2 Bland 563 (Chancery 1681), in which a Maryland chancery court ordered a husband not
to harm his wife greater than that permitted by chastisement.
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the court relied on either Blackstone or English common law.30 For example,
in 1824, the Supreme Court of Mississippi explicitly recognized the right of
chastisement in the case of Bradley v. State.31 The court quoted both
Blackstone and an English case.32 Relying on these precedents, the court held:
To screen from public reproach those who may be thus unhappily situated, let
the husband be permitted to exercise the right of moderate chastisement, in
cases of great emergency, and use salutary restraints in every case of
misbehavior, without being subjected to vexatious prosecutions, resulting in
the mutual discredit and shame of all parties concerned.33

In addition, the court acknowledged the right must be exercised within
limitations of “reasonableness,” including using a “whip or rattan, no bigger
than my thumb.”34 In 1836, the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on
English common law to acknowledge the husband’s right to control his wife by
force.35 North Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Pennsylvania all followed
suit.36
Toward the last half of the nineteenth century, courts began to reject the
husband’s right of chastisement.37 The retreat from Blackstone’s position
30. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-48 (1871) (citing 2 Kent’s Comm. 181).
31. Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824).
32. Id. at 157.
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id. at 157.
35. Poor v. Poor, 8 N.H. 307, 316 (1836). In this case, the wife sought a divorce based on
extreme cruelty from being beaten with a club and whipped with a horse whip. The court denied
her claims, citing to the English case, reported at 2 Eng. Ecclesiastical R. 163, 164. While the
court rejected a blanket right of chastisement, the court found that the husband’s actions were
justified in response to the actions of the wife. As the court stated:
And we are of opinion, on the whole, that however obnoxious to censure the conduct of
the husband may have been on any, or on all the occasions to which we have adverted, the
wife has no right to complain; because it is in the highest degree probable that in every
instance she drew down upon herself the chastisement she received, by her own improper
conduct. And it does not appear that on any occasion the injury she received was much
out of proportion to her offence. Her remedy is to be sought, then, not in this court, but in
a reformation of her own manners. Let her return to the path of duty; and if to a discreet
and prudent exercise of her just rights and privileges as a wife, she will join that
meekness, patience and kindness which the religion she professes inculcates, and temper
all her conduct towards her husband with that sweetness and goodness which belong to
the true character of a wife, we think she will have no reasonable ground to apprehend
any further injury to her person. Let her submit to the authority of her husband, and
remember that the dignity of a wife cannot be violated by such submission. Let her return
to the path of duty; and by displaying in all her conduct the mild and gentle spirit of the
gospel, make that path a path of peace and safety.
Poor, 8 N.H. at 319-20.
36. Murray, supra note 13, at 442.
37. Stedman, supra note 27, at 246-48.
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regarding the right of a husband to beat his wife can be observed in the works
of several American legal scholars. In 1848, Francis Wharton stated that, “By
the ancient common law, the husband possessed the power of chastising his
wife, though the tendency of criminal courts in the present day is to regard the
marital relation as no defence to a battery.”38 The first states to legislate
against domestic violence were Tennessee in 1850 and Georgia in 1857.39 In
1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the right of chastisement.40 Its
rejection, however, acknowledged the recent existence of the right of
chastisement:
Judge Blackstone . . . published his commentaries above one hundred years
ago, when society was much more rude . . . than it is at the present day in this
country; and the exercise of a rude privilege there is no excuse for a like
privilege here . . . . The wife is not to be considered as the husband’s slave.
And the privilege, ancient though it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair,
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law.41

It is clear, therefore, that the American judicial system expressly sanctioned
domestic violence until the middle of the nineteenth century.42
B.

The Rise of Privacy Discourse and Implicit Sanction of Domestic Violence

The movement away from the rule of chastisement was brought about by
reform that expanded the legal rights of women. This transformation,
however, did not end the legal sanction of domestic violence. On the contrary,
at the same time that courts were rejecting the husband’s right to beat his wife,
courts employed a growing societal privacy discourse, thereby removing
domestic violence from the purview of the law. The result was that at the
exact moment when the law rejected express permission to domestic violence,
the courts implicitly condoned domestic violence by adhering to notions of
domestic privacy.

38. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 314
(1846).
39. PLECK, supra note 25, at 63.
40. Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871).
41. Id. at 146-47.
42. The connection between the rejection of the rule of chastisement and the rise of
abolitionism is interesting. The courts appear to have made a distinction between the rights of
white men and those of black slaves. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 2134-41. See also COTT supra
note 19, at 80 (comparing the rights of freed slaves after the Civil War with the rights of women).
For a general discussion of domestic violence and the Thirteenth Amendment, see Joyce E.
McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992).
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1. The Changing Legal Status of Women in America
The English common law of coverture and unities remained the law in
America until nearly the 1850s. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century,
states began to recognize that women remained individuals, even during
marriage.43 Changes in the legal status of women — and inroads into the
rejection of the concepts of coverture and unities — were reflected in the
married women’s property and earnings acts of that period.44 Although there
was often a difference between recognition of full equality and the ability to
exercise that equality,45 there is no question that the legal status of women was
dramatically different in the mid 1800s. Women now had the legal right to
contract, to sue, and to testify.46
2. Rise of Privacy Discourse and Creation of Private Realm
The increased rights of women in the middle of the nineteenth century
began to alter the balance of power between husbands and wives.47 In
addition, the expanding legal rights of women challenged traditional male
dominance and authority over the family.48 While legal reforms secured
women greater rights, these efforts were unsuccessful at legally establishing
actual equality for women.49

43. Dalton, supra note 18, at 327.
44. Id. See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (discussing
Missouri’s Married Women’s Act). The Act recognized a woman’s right to “transact business . . .
to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, and to enforce and have enforced against
her property such judgments as may be rendered for and against her, and [to] sue and be sued at
law or in equity, with or without her husband being joined as a party.” Id. at 647-48. Missouri
first recognized these rights by case law in 1855. Id. at 647. See also PLECK, supra note 25, at
94.
Lucinda Chandler [a Quaker reformer] attempted in 1873 to repeal the law of coverture in
the District of Columbia. Chandler wanted to give every woman “the legal custody and
control of her person in wifehood to govern according to her wisdom and instinct the
maternal office and protect her children as well as she may from the dangers of selfish
passion, alcoholism, and vice.”
Id.
45. See Townsend, 708 S.W.2d at 650. For nearly 100 years after the passage of the
Missouri Married Women’s Act, Missouri courts refused to enforce the rights included in the Act.
Finally, in Townsend, the Missouri Supreme Court gave full effect to the 1889 statute. Id. See
generally Dalton, supra note 18.
46. Dalton, supra note 18, at 327.
47. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 218 (2000).
48. Id. at 218; see COTT, supra note 19, at 80 (detailing a discussion surrounding the passage
of the 13th Amendment prohibiting slavery, and noting that earlier versions of the amendment
that might have been interpreted to allow for the equality of husbands and wives were rejected as
being too broad).
49. PLECK, supra note 25, at 106-07.
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Around this time, American society began to articulate a discourse of
privacy that created and preserved a private realm for women. As Frances
Olsen detailed:
In the early nineteenth century, as men’s work was largely removed to the
factory while women’s work remained primarily in the home, there came to be
a sharp dichotomy between “the home” and “the [workaday] world.” This
dichotomy took on many of the moral overtones developed in the theological
dichotomy between heaven and earth. Often the home was referred to as
“sacred” . . . . The family and home were seen as safe repositories for the
virtues and emotions that people believed were being banished from the work
of commerce and industry. The home was said to provide a haven from the
anxieties of modern life – a shelter for those moral and spiritual values which
the commercial spirit and the critical spirit were threatening to destroy.50

The economic realities were coupled with a powerful shift in public
discourse regarding the role of women in society.51 Prior to the American
Revolution, men were viewed as the primary embodiments of the American
spirit of republicanism.52 Partially in response to a perceived erosion of public
decency due to the economic explosion following the American Revolution,
women were being discussed as the guardians of the future of the nation.53

50. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983) (quotation omitted).
51. Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age of
Jackson, in OUR AMERICAN SISTERS: WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 132 (Jean E.
Friedman, William G. Shade, and Mary Jane Capozzoli eds., 1987).
The image of “the lady” was elevated to the accepted ideal of femininity toward which all
women would strive. In this formulation of values lower class women were simply
ignored. The actual lady was, of course, nothing new on the American scene; she had
been present ever since colonial days. What was new in the 1830’s was the cult of the
lady, her elevation to a status symbol. The advancing prosperity of the early nineteenth
century made it possible for middle class women to aspire to the status formerly reserved
for upper class women. The “cult of true womanhood” of the 1830’s became a vehicle for
such aspirations. Mass circulation newspapers and magazines made it possible to teach
every woman how to elevate the status of her family by setting “proper” standards of
behavior, dress and literary tastes. Godey’s Lady’s Book and innumerable gift books and
tracts of the period all preached the same gospel of “true womanhood” – piety, purity,
domesticity. Those unable to reach the goal of becoming ladies were to be satisfied with
the lesser goal - acceptance of their “proper place” in the home.
Id.
52. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 356 (1992).
53. CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 147-48 (1984). “Christian morality and domestic ideology preached a hard line: women
were the guardians of the family, the conscience of the household. Women were expected to
fulfill the dictates of their domestic roles as well as provide the family with unimpeachable moral
example.” Id.
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[W]ives and mothers were now urged to use their special talents to cultivate in
their husbands and children the proper moral feelings – the virtue,
benevolence, and social affections – necessary to hold a sprawling and
competitive republican society together.54

The result of the new economic realities and the new republican virtue
discourse was the creation of separate spheres for men and women.55 Women
were in charge of the private sphere of the household and raising and educating
children and as such were the guardians of the spirituality of the nation.56 Men
were in charge of the public sphere of commerce and the economy.57 While
the relegation of women to the private sphere of family and home had
important impacts on women,58 in the context of domestic violence, its
significance lay in non-intervention of the law into the private realm.59
3. Reflection of Privacy Discourse in the Criminal Law
The same court decisions that rejected the rule of chastisement
incorporated the public-private dichotomy discourse to limit the reach of the
criminal law. In her discussion of the 1868 North Carolina case of State v.
Rhodes, Reva Siegel details the transformation from the outright legality of
domestic violence to tacit sanction through non-intervention based on
preservation of the private sphere.60 In Rhodes, the husband beat his wife with

54. WOOD, supra note 52, at 357.
55. Id. See also Lerner, supra note 51, at 134.
56. John S. C. Abbott, The Mother at Home; or the Principles of Maternal Duty, Familiarly
Illustrated (1833), in EARLY AMERICAN WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-1900, at
209 (Nancy Woloch, ed. 1992).
When our land is filled with pious and patriotic mothers, then will it be filled with
virtuous and patriotic men . . . O mothers! reflect upon the power your Maker has placed
in your hands! There is no earthly influence to be compared with yours. There is no
combination of causes so powerful in promoting the happiness or the misery of our race,
as the instructions of home. In a most peculiar sense God has constituted you the
guardians and the controllers of the human family.
Id.
57. Olsen, supra note 50, at 1499-1501.
58. Id. at 1500.
The market/family dichotomy tended to exclude women from the world of the
marketplace while promising them a central role in the supposedly equally important
domestic sphere. The dichotomy encouraged women to be generous and nurturant but
discouraged them from being strong and self-reliant; it insulated women from the world’s
corruption but denied them the world’s stimulation. While the dichotomy tended to mask
the inferior, degraded position of women, it also provided a degree of autonomy and a
base from which women could and did elevate their status.
Id.
59. Id. at 1504-07.
60. Siegel, supra note 15, at 2154-61.
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a switch.61 While the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
stating it would not recognize proper chastisement, it went on to say that the
court in the future will not intervene into the private realm of domestic
relations:
The courts have been loath to take cognizance of trivial complaints arising out
of the domestic relations – such as master and apprentice, teacher and pupil,
parent and child, husband and wife. Not because those relations are not
subject to law, but because the evil of publicity would be greater than the evil
involved in the trifles complained of; and because they ought to be left to
family government . . . [T]he ground upon which we have put this decision, is
not, that the husband has the right to whip his wife much or little; but that we
will not interfere with family government in trifling cases. We will no more
interfere where the husband whips the wife, than where the wife whips the
husband; and yet we would hardly be supposed to hold, that a wife has a right
to whip her husband. We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of
raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling
violence.62

In order to preserve the private sphere, the law would not interfere. Violence
against women occurring within that private sphere, therefore, was beyond the
protection of the law.63 The public-private dichotomy had the practical effect
of sanctioning violence against women, though, unlike chastisement, it did not
explicitly sanction such violence.64
C. The Battered Women’s Movement and the Feminist Critique of the PublicPrivate Dichotomy in Domestic Violence
Beginning in the 1970s, the women’s movement questioned the relegation
of women to the private sphere.65 Specifically, the battered women’s
movement challenged the relegation of violence against women to the private
sphere and the law’s non-intervention into that sphere. The efforts of the
battered women’s movement contributed to a significant shift in the way
society viewed domestic violence. It enabled public recognition of the private
harm.66

61. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868).
62. Id. at 454-59.
63. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 984-85 (1991)
[hereinafter Schneider, Privacy]. See also Raeder, supra note 8, at 1466.
64. Dalton, supra note 18, at 329.
65. Rice, supra note 4, at 941.
66. Id. (citing A. Reneé Callahan, Will the “Real” Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In
Search of a Realistic Definition of Battered Women’s Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 117, 119-120 (1994)).
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One of the central insights of feminist legal scholarship has been to
identify public-private dichotomies in the American legal system and to assess
the impact of such dichotomies.67 According to feminist scholars, the impact
of the creation of separate spheres and the isolation of women in the private
sphere is twofold.68 First, women are confined to the private sphere of family
and domestic life; men are free to operate in the public world of the
marketplace and government.69 Women, therefore, are limited in their options
and are shielded from public scrutiny. According to feminist scholarship, the
isolation of women into the private sphere has contributed to the subjugation of
women in American society. As Elizabeth Schneider comments:
The rhetoric of privacy that has insulated the female world from the legal order
sends an important ideological message to the rest of society. It devalues
women and their functions and says that women are not important enough to
merit legal regulation . . . . These are important messages, for denying
woman’s humanity and the value of her traditional work are key ideological
components in maintaining woman’s subordinate status. The message of
women’s inferiority is compounded by the totality of the law’s absence from
the private realm. In our society, law is for business and other important
things. The fact that the law in general claims to have so little bearing on
women’s day-to-day concerns reflects and underscores their insignificance.
Thus, the legal order’s overall contribution to the devaluation of women is
greater than the sum of the negative messages conveyed by individual legal
doctrines.70

Second, the public-private dichotomy serves to remove the law from the
private sphere and reserve it for the public sphere as the “proper” consideration
of government.71 The State preserves the private realm which – by definition –
is beyond the protection of the law.72 The result is, as Robin West states:
67. See, e.g., Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000); Olsen, supra note 50.
68. Several scholars have questioned the validity of a complete separation of the public and
private. As Elizabeth Schneider states:
There is no realm of personal and family life that exists totally separate from the reach of
the state. The state defines both the family, the so-called private sphere, and the market,
the so-called public sphere. “Private” and “public” exist on a continuum. Thus, in the socalled private sphere of domestic and family life, which is purportedly immune from law,
there is always the selective application of law. Significantly, this selective application of
law invokes “privacy” as a rationale for immunity in order to protect male domination.
Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 977.
69. Hannah L. Meils, A Lesson from NAFTA: Can the FTAA Function as a Tool for
Improvement in the Lives of Working Women?, 78 IND. L.J. 877, 886 (2003).
70. Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 978.
71. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (1996).
72. See generally Scheider, Privacy, supra note 63.
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The Constitution protects the individual against abusive and violent state
conduct, but not only does it not protect women against the abuse and violence
that most threatens them, it perversely protects the sphere of privacy and
liberty within which the abuse and violence takes place.73

In the context of domestic violence, feminist legal scholars have identified
two primary impacts of the public-private dichotomy: sanctioning violence
against women and encouraging the individualization of domestic violence.74
Viewing domestic violence as a private issue sanctions violence against
women because the law refuses to intervene into the private realm in which the
violence occurs.75
The second insight of feminist scholarship in the domestic violence context
is that the public-private dichotomy allows the issue of domestic violence to be
viewed as a private, individual matter, not a subject for public concern. As
Schneider says, “By seeing woman-abuse as ‘private,’ we affirm it as a
problem that is individual, that only involves a particular male-female
relationship, and for which there is no social responsibility to remedy.”76 The
public-private dichotomy, therefore, allows the individualization of domestic
violence. Society is free to view the issue not as a social epidemic but as an
individual pathology. The true nature of the issue is shielded from society at
large or is denied by society at large.
As a result of the battered women’s movement, the public-private
dichotomy in the domestic violence arena began to break down.77 Society
started to recognize domestic violence as a public harm, which justified state
intervention into the private sphere. Most states have enacted legislation
specifically designed to overcome the private nature of the offense and to
emphasize the public aspect of the issue.78 States adopted mandatory arrest
laws, enabled battered women to obtain restraining orders, and enforced nodrop policies which emphasized that the state – not the victim – was
prosecuting the offense.79 In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against
Women Act (“VAWA”), recognizing that domestic violence has national
impact.80 VAWA also funded many police and prosecution efforts to combat
domestic violence and made several domestic violence crimes federal

73. ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 120-21 (1994).
74. See generally Hanna, supra note 71, at 1869; Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 983.
75. Hanna, supra note 71, at 1869. See also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 100 (1987).
76. Schneider, Privacy, supra note 63, at 983.
77. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 67.
78. Hanna, supra note 71, at 1857, 1859, 1869.
79. Id. at 1857-65.
80. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

TRUE TO CHARACTER

327

offenses.81 The impact of increased public recognition of the private harm of
domestic violence has been mixed. The beginning of the breakdown in the
public-private dichotomy has brought relief to millions of American women
who previously had suffered in silence. This has been a significant and
important move forward in the battle against domestic violence.
Unfortunately, the numbers tell a less positive story. According to the
United States Department of Justice, the greatest cause of injuries to women in
the United States is still domestic violence.82 The statistics are compelling and
can be broken down into many permutations.83 A batterer beats a woman
approximately every twelve seconds.84 Four million women a year are
victimized by domestic violence,85 and nearly 2000 women die every year
from domestic violence.86 According to some estimates, half of all the women
in the country suffer an abusive relationship during their lifetime.87 Women
are two hundred times more likely to be assaulted by a family member than by
someone who is not a family member.88 Standing alone, these statistics should
give pause. Even more alarming is the fact that these figures have remained
essentially unchanged despite legal efforts to overcome domestic violence.
Even after thirty years of both express sanction against domestic violence and

81. Sally F. Goldfarb, No Civilized System of Justice: The Fate of the Violence Against
Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 504-05 (2000) (discussing various provisions of VAWA).
VAWA also created a civil remedy for victims of domestic violence. The Supreme Court struck
down the civil remedy as unconstitutional in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
82. See supra note 4.
83. For example, “If every woman victimized by domestic violence in 1989 alone were to
join hands in a line, the string of people would span from New York to Los Angeles and back
again.” Ogden, supra note 7, at 363.
84. Rice, supra note 4, at 940.
85. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
86. Female homicides committed by intimates were estimated in the year 2000 to be
approximately 1,300. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE U.S., INTIMATE HOMICIDE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/
intimates.htm (revised Nov. 21, 2002). Estimates of female homicides by intimates reveal a
larger number in 1976 (approximately 1,600) with declining figures through 1995 (approximately
1,300). See SILENT WITNESS NATIONAL INITIATIVE, STATISTICS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
available at http://www.silentwitness.net/sub/violences.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004). But other
sources have estimated that as many as 3,000 women were murdered by their intimates in 1976
and 2,000 women died at the hands of their spouse, former spouse, or boyfriend as recently as
1996. See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at v, l.
87. Ogden, supra note 7, at 363.
88. “[W]omen suffering violent victimizations are almost twice as likely to be injured if the
offender was an intimate rather than a stranger.” Raeder, supra note 8, at 1467 (citing RONET
BACHMAN, UNITED STATES DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN iii (1994)).
“Women and children die at a rate of three per day due to beatings at the hands of someone they
love.” Ogden, supra note 7, at 363.
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public recognition of domestic violence, domestic violence remains the single
greatest cause of injury to women in America.89
In an effort to expose the true repetitive nature of domestic violence – and
to explain why women stayed in violent relationships – the battered women’s
movement attempted to articulate and analyze the dynamics of a domestic
violence relationship. The first attempt embraced the paradigm of the “cycle
of violence.”90 Violence within intimate relationships was presented as
following fairly typical patterns and phases.91 These phases were defined as
the tension-building phase, the violent phase, and the honeymoon phase,92 and
together they constituted the cycle of violence.93 At the same time, the
battered women’s movement sought to defend women accused of killing their
batterers.94 The culmination of this effort was the recognition of the battered
woman syndrome.95 A negative result of the public presentation of domestic
violence as a cycle of violence and the creation of the battered woman
syndrome was that domestic violence relationships and parties were cast in
stagnant roles with readily recognizable characteristics.96 Without question,
these two efforts were critical to raising public awareness of the epidemic of
89. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 372
(2003).
90. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 369 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 55 (1979)); Letendre, supra note 10, at 976.
91. See id. at 369-70.
92. Unfortunately, it is during the honeymoon phase when the batterer is seeking forgiveness
and the victim sees hope of reconciliation that efforts toward prosecution of the batterer also
occur, which often causes initially cooperative victims to begin actively working against the
prosecution, sometimes to the point of cooperating with defense attorneys, hiring defense
attorneys for the batterer, and posting bail for the batterer’s release. De Sanctis, supra note 8, at
369-70.
93. See Letendre, supra note 10, at 976.
Minor episodes of violence may occur in the tension-building stage where individuals
cope by avoiding or placating their batterers. In the next phase, explosive or acute
battering incidents occur, which may last from a few minutes to several days. [In the]
honeymoon phase . . . the batterer showers the victim with apologies, love, and affection.
Id. at 976 (citing WALKER, supra note 90, at 56-70). But see R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P.
Dobash, The Nature and Antecedents of Violent Events, 24 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269, 283
(1984) (indicating that some batterers proceed directly from inflicting physical violence back to a
tension-building stage).
94. See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING 112-47 (2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN].
95. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 420-23 (1991) (discussing rules of evidence
which allow certain types of evidence in cases raising the “battered woman” defense).
96. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 94, at 60-62, 72, 120. See also LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 75-94 (1984) (discussing the personality
characteristics of the battered woman).
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domestic violence.
However, they presented significant problems to
prosecution of domestic violence.97 The bottom line was that the roles
assigned to the parties of a domestic violence relationship did not fit reality.
In recent years, domestic violence advocates have proposed a different
framework for conceptualizing battering relationships. These theorists posit
that the domestic violence relationship is not about conflict; rather, it is simply
about power and control.98 According to this theory, domestic violence is a
97. “For every 100 domestic assaults, only 14 assaults are reported, 1.5 batterers are
arrested, and 0.49 defendants are convicted.” Letendre, supra note 10, at 978 (citing DONALD G.
DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PERSPECTIVES 223 (1995) [hereinafter DUTTON, PERSPECTIVES]). See also De Sanctis, supra
note 8, at 367. “Victims of domestic violence are uncooperative in approximately eighty to
ninety percent of cases.” Id. Domestic violence prosecutions are also complicated by recanting
victims, lack of corroborating witnesses and physical evidence, lack of meaningful punishments,
and juror bias against domestic violence victims. Various reasons for domestic violence victims’
reluctance have been noted by both researchers and the courts including: fear of retaliation,
coercion by the perpetrator via promises that future violence will stop if the victim recants, and a
lack of faith in the justice system as a means of protection from future violence. Ogden, supra
note 7, at 373-74 (citing State v. Grant, 920 P.2d 609, 613 n.5 (Wash. 1996)) (discussing research
as to why domestic violence victims may appear inconsistent when responding to abuse).
Letendre, supra note 10, at 980-82 (providing a detailed discussion of male juror bias, female
juror bias and general juror expectations of domestic violence situations that combine to create a
tendency for jurors to accept the notion that the victim is partly to blame for her own battering).
“Without evidence [such as would be offered except for the character evidence prohibition] to
dispel these biases, jurors are inclined to believe the batterer over the victim, thereby increasing
the difficulty of convicting domestic violence perpetrators.” Id. at 982. See also De Sanctis,
supra note 8, at 371-73, (providing additional discussion of gender bias in domestic violence
cases).
The lingering effects of this country’s history of sexism include according a woman’s
testimony less credibility than that granted to a man’s testimony. The woman witness is
thought to be less rational and have less accurate testimonial qualities such as memory,
perception, and narration. She is also thought to be less trustworthy and more willing to
exaggerate.
Id. at 373 (citing CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN THE COURTS § 6, 4-5
(1990)).
98. Daniel Jay Sonkin & William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in the
Prosecution of Male Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 218, 222-23 (Daniel Jay Sonkin ed., 1987); Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH L.
REV. 1, 53 (1991). Some scholars have also noted that “[t]he psychological control of abused
parties through intermittent use of physical assault along with psychological abuse (verbal abuse,
isolation, threats of violence, etc.) is typical of domestic violence and is the same set of control
tactics used by captors against prisoners of war and hostages.” Anne L. Ganley, Domestic
Violence: The What, Why and Who, as Relevant to Criminal and Civil Court Domestic Violence
Cases, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES 2-5 to 2-6 (Helen Halpert et. al. eds.,
1997).
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pattern of verbal and physical abuse directed at an individual in order to
control the behavior of that person.99 Because the inherent goal of the abuse is
control over the victim, batterers seldom stop at a single violent incident, and
past violent behavior in a relationship is a good predictor of future violence, as
“data indicate that, about 63% of the time, if assaults occur once, they are
likely to be repeated.”100
Some common
The batterer’s behavior can take many forms.101
manifestations of that behavior are economic or financial restrictions,102
physical and emotional isolation, repeated invasions of privacy and monitoring
of behavior, severing support from family or friends, threats of violence toward
the victim, threats of suicide, addicting the victim to drugs or alcohol, and
physical or sexual assaults.103
The purpose of the abusive behavior is to subjugate the victim and to
establish the superiority of the batterer.104 Subjugation and superiority create
constant tension.105 The notion of cycles of violence with alternating periods
of violence and respite do not reflect reality.106 Women report varying degrees
of tension, but rarely describe periods of relief from the efforts of the batterer

99. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfufilled Promises for Women
Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1167 (1995).
100. DUTTON, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 97, at 8-9. Moreover, when an abuser moves on to
another relationship, it is highly likely that he will continue to use abuse and violence as a
mechanism for control over his new partner. Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing:
Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 85 (1992).
101. “Injuries sustained by women as a result of marital violence range from bruises, cuts,
black eyes, concussions, broken bones, and miscarriages to permanent injuries – such as damage
to joints, partial loss of hearing or vision, scars from burns, bites or knife wounds, or even death.”
Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage: Until Death Do Us Part, in VIOLENCE BETWEEN
INTIMATE PARTNERS: PATTERNS, CAUSES AND EFFECTS 50, 52 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1977).
102. If a victim of domestic violence leaves here abuser “there is a 50% chance that her
standard of living will drop below the poverty line.” De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 368 (citing
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Statistics Packet 39-40) (3d ed. Feb.
1994).
103. “[The] power and control wheel is commonly used to explain the many facets of
domestic violence, which includes coercion and threats, intimidation, emotional abuse, isolation,
minimization, denial and blaming, use of children to control the victim, use of male privilege and
economic resource abuse.” Raeder, supra note 8, at 1471 (citing Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1206 (1993) [hereinafter Dutton, Understanding]). See
also Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 975, 983 (1995).
104. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 93, at 286; NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN,
WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 29 (1998).
105. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 93, at 283.
106. Id.
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to subjugate them.107 The concept of power and control better reflects the
reality that each victim is unique, that each batterer presents a different
combination of battering behavior, and that each victim responds differently to
that pattern of behavior.108 The success of the superiority/subjugation battle
varies with each woman and with each relationship.109 As one scholar notes,
“In domestic violence cases, this translates to individual acts of abuse, forming
a blueprint that details how to control the victim, even though the act may
differ in type and severity. Therefore, intimidation, stalking, assault and
property crimes are all integral to the grand design.”110 Furthermore, the
notion that tensions increase until a breaking point is reached suggests that the
defendant is, at that point, not in control of the situation. Recent studies
demonstrate exactly the opposite is true.111 Rather than being a crime of
passion, researchers are discovering that domestic violence is a calculated and
focusing event for the batterer that reinforces his ability to control his
victim.112 The batterer may often be more in control during an act of violence
than before or after.113
Contemporary scholarship provides crucial insights into the realities of
domestic violence, realities that lend coherence to a new application of the
character evidence rule in domestic violence cases.114 These realities of the
battering relationship show that the crime of domestic violence is not an
isolated instance of misbehavior that can be strictly defined as to date and
time.115 Rather, it is a long-term pattern of behavior that involves a variety of
behaviors.116

107. Id. at 283; Dutton, Understanding, supra note 103, at 1206-07; Stark, supra note 103, at
975, 983.
108. Raeder, supra note 8, at 283.
109. Patterns of abuse naturally vary according to the interactive relationship of the batterer
and his victim. The intimacy of the relationship offers the batterer the insight to know what
psychological and physical abuses work to achieve control over his victim. “There is no single
typology of psychological abuse which has been consistently used in social science, and there is
no one profile of batterers.” Raeder, supra note 8, at 1471, (citing Dutton, Understanding, supra
note 103, at 1205 and DONALD G. DUTTON & SOSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 25 (1995)).
110. Raeder, supra note 8, at 1496.
111. JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 104, at 28-29. Jacobson and Gottman studied 201
couples in conflict in controlled settings. Id. They discovered that the heart rate of nearly one
fifth of batterers dropped during violence. Id. Jacobson and Gottman concluded that for these
batterers, the violence was deliberate, focused, and controlled. Id.
112. Letendre, supra note 10, at 977.
113. JACOBSEN & GOTTMAN, supra note 104, at 29.
114. Raeder, supra note 8, at 1465, 1493, 1505.
115. See generally DUTTON & GOLANT, supra note 109, at 39-52.
116. Id. at 22-23.
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D. Perpetuation of the Privacy Discourse through the
Character Evidence Ban
The increased prosecution efforts, spurred by the battered women’s
movement, have come into conflict with the character evidence ban, which
precludes evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence from
being introduced in the current prosecution. Given the repetitive nature of
domestic violence, the character evidence ban is at issue in nearly every
domestic violence case. The result has been that the character evidence ban
has limited the reach of the public recognition of the private violence and
perpetuated the implicit sanction of domestic violence.
1. The Character Evidence Rule
Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 404 establishes the general prohibition
on admission of the defendant’s character:
(a) Character Evidence Generally – Evidence of a person’s character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused – Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the
accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim – Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness – Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts – Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused,
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.117

117. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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The general rule is that a defendant’s character – including evidence of
prior acts of violence – is not admissible to show that, with regard to the
charged crime, the defendant acted consistently with his established
character.118 In other words, the defendant’s prior bad acts cannot be used to
show that the defendant committed the present charged crime. While the rule
allows for certain exceptions, the general character ban is included in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence codes of every state. Indeed, the
character evidence rule “is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to
assume almost constitutional proportions.”119
2. The Importance of the Character Evidence Rule in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions
No other evidence rule goes to the heart of a particular crime the way that
the character evidence rule does with domestic violence. The fundamental
nature of domestic violence is that it is behavior repeated over time.120 In the
domestic violence context, the character evidence ban denies the nature of
domestic violence, creates an unlevel playing field that reinforces negative and
inaccurate stereotypes about women, and perpetuates violence against women.
i.

Denial of Women’s Realities

One troubling statistic in domestic violence cases is that, on average,
women do not involve the police until after the seventh incident of violence
within the relationship.121 This statistic tells us that by the time women are
involved in the criminal justice system as domestic violence victims, they have
already been victimized repeatedly.122 Women do not enter courtrooms as
victims of isolated incidents of violence. Rather, they suffer a pattern of
violence meant to accomplish subjugation and control.123 Each incident of

118. See id.
119. FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE AND RULES 250-51, 56 F.R.D. 183, 219 (1972) (Advisory
Committee Note on subdivision (a)).
120. See supra notes 7-8.
121. Dutton, Understanding, supra note 109, at 1213. See also BEVERLY FORD, VIOLENT
RELATIONSHIPS: BATTERING AND ABUSE AMONG ADULTS 8 (2001) (indicating that only ten
percent of domestic violence incidents are reported to the police).
122. See supra notes 7-8.
123. It is noteworthy that recent studies have shown a similar use of violence as a control
mechanism over women in cases of heterosexual rape. “In some American subcultures, violence
is a socially approved way of getting what one wants, including control over other persons. One
way men can control women is to force them to submit to degrading activities, including sexual
intimacy against their will.” Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 147 (citing A. Nicholas
Groth & Ann W. Burgess, Rape: A Sexual Deviation, in MALE RAPE: A CASEBOOK OF SEXUAL
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violence is critical to creating the pattern and accomplishing the control.124
Further, the repetition of violence committed by intimate partners changes the
nature of the victims’ stories; their stories are fundamentally different from the
stories of victims of isolated, random violence at the hands of strangers.125
For example, consider the experience of the female bank teller who is
ordered at gun point to turn over the contents of her cash drawer. To this
woman, it matters little whether the robber has committed fourteen similar
bank robberies. There is nothing about the bank teller’s experience that is
altered by the fact that it is the robber’s fifteenth bank. Contrast this with the
experience of the domestic violence victim who has been subjected to fourteen
prior incidents of violence at the hands of her abuser. The fifteenth incident
derives a portion of its meaning and importance in its connection to the
fourteen other incidents. But the character evidence rule precludes discussing
this pattern in court.
The character evidence rule denies the domestic violence victim’s reality
on two levels. First, the fact of repetitive violence does not exist within the
courtroom. Second, the victim must discuss an isolated incident without its
larger context of repetitive violence. Isolating the incident from its context
denies that which gives it a substantial part of its meaning. A kick in the
crotch is a significant violation of personal autonomy. However, a kick in the
crotch in context of past forced sexual activities may convey a different
meaning.126 The current construction of the character evidence rule precludes
the victim from discussing her more nuanced reality of the kick in the crotch.
This denial of the victim’s reality within the courtroom has profound
impact on the victim. When victims are prevented from discussing their
AGGRESSIONS 231, 234-35 (Anthony M. Scacco, Jr. ed., 1982) and CHARLES H. MCCAGHY,
CRIME IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 124-29 (1980)).
124. See supra note 7.
125. Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman
Syndrome and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
789, 792 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, Double-Edged].
126. Intimidation and humiliation of the victim by the batterer is part of the pattern of
domestic violence. Raeder, supra, note 8, at 1471. To illustrate this point, Raeder recounts a
circumstance from the relationship of O.J. Simpson and Nicole Brown Simpson in which
Simpson’s actions toward his wife on two occasions were illustrative of the deeper meaning of
the acts:
Simpson placed his hand on his wife’s crotch and said that “this is where babies come
from and this belongs to me, this is mine.” [On another occasion] he [Simpson] told the
police to get her [Nicole Brown Simpson] out of his bed because he had two women.
These statements identified his wife’s value as merely reflective of her husband’s interest
in her; she mattered only so long as he cared for her to matter. This attitude is one which
exemplifies why violence in a battering relationship is often an aspect of control
dependent upon the batterer’s internal needs, not simply his wife’s conduct.
Id. at 1471-72.
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reality, they often become frustrated, confused, and disenfranchised. The
system that the victim turned to for protection mimics the abusive patterns of
the relationship from which she is seeking refuge. The purpose of battering is
to create an altered reality for the victim so that she will bear the abuse. One
of the most powerful tools in the batterer’s arsenal is the ability to engage the
societal stigma against victims by convincing the victim that if she reports the
violence, she will either not be believed or will be blamed for not leaving the
relationship.127 When the legal system denies the victim’s reality, it
contributes to the social stigma against victims and directly reinforces the
victim’s sense that her story is not believable, that it is not important.
ii. Hides True Nature of Domestic Violence
Because it suppresses the reality of the relationship, the character evidence
rule also hides the true nature of domestic violence from the public. When the
victim is not permitted to place the charged incident into the pattern of abuse,
the jury is permitted to believe that domestic violence incidents are isolated
incidents, stemming primarily from conflict within the relationship. In
addition, the jury members – as representatives of society – are allowed only a
limited view into what constitutes domestic violence. The true nature of the
problem is hidden from the jurors.
The character evidence rule works powerfully to the disadvantage of
women in domestic violence cases in another way. At the same time that the
legal system designed a ban on the character of the defendant, the rules
evolved in such a way that the character of the victim was always relevant and
admissible.128 The overwhelming majority of victims of domestic violence are
women, and their character is admissible while the batterer’s character is
not.129 Ironically, men’s character remains private, while women’s character is
exposed to public discussion and adjudication. The result of FRE 404 has been
that the male abuser defines the discourse relating to the private sphere of the
intimate relationship. Male defendants have been able to discuss the private
life of the victim because that goes to her credibility, while his own private life
is protected. In other words, FRE 404 creates an unlevel playing field that is
tilted in favor of men. Male domestic violence defendants are permitted to
paint the character of female victims as irrational, overly emotional, hysterical,

127. Justine A. Dunlap, The Pitiless Double Abuse of Battered Mothers, 11 AMER. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 523, 524 (2003). “A battered woman is stereotyped as weak, helpless,
incapable or unwilling to redress the situation in which she finds herself. This stereotype faults
the battered woman for her batterer’s actions.” Id.
128. See 1 WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62, 194 (2d ed. 1923).
129. See De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 367 n.47; DUTTON, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 97, at 45.
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and vindictive.130 Due to FRE 404, the jury hears only about the charged act;
viewing the act in isolation strengthens the defendant’s arguments about the
nature of the victim’s character: she is over-reacting to a single incident.131
Through FRE 404, the legal system tells a truncated story about domestic
violence. The story is that the violence is an isolated incident in the life of this
particular dysfunctional relationship, due mainly to the irrational character of
the woman. The story is at heart a fiction that perpetuates other fictions;
namely, violence against women is somehow connected to, or caused by, the
character or behavior of specific women. This serves to conceal the real truth:
society and the law condone male violence against women.
There is a more subtle difficulty with FRE 404 at the intersection between
the public’s understanding of domestic violence and the exposition of a
domestic violence incident in the courtroom. Due to the tremendous work of
the women’s movement in general and the battered women’s movement
specifically, society now has a better understanding of domestic violence.
Even though much is still unknown about the magnitude of the problem, there
is clearly more discussion of domestic violence in the media, movies, and
magazines than at any other time in history. There are many positive results
from greater public awareness. This greater public awareness, however, poses
a significant problem in the courtroom, particularly in conjunction with FRE
404.
Due to the efforts of the public awareness campaign surrounding domestic
violence, many jurors have preconceived notions of what constitutes a
domestic violence relationship, regarding the characteristics and actions of
battered women.132 The difficulty lies in the intersection of that preconceived
understanding of domestic violence and the inadmissibility of prior acts of
violence within the relationship. The result is that the jury, expecting to see
evidence about the cycle of violence, discounts the experience of the victim as
not being “real” domestic violence because she is allowed to discuss only one
incident.133
For example, the popular perception of the battered woman is one who
resists the prosecution’s efforts and who will recant the statements she gave to
the police implicating the batterer. Jurors understand the fact that a victim will
often recant her testimony due to coercion from the batterer or to protect
130. See supra note 97 (discussing juror bias in perceptions of domestic violence victims).
131. Id. Furthermore, “When the jury is not given a complete picture of the abusive
relationship, it has a false perception of the relationship as normal. Without the [previous
uncharged] acts, it is easier to portray the victim as a lying vengeful woman or to downgrade the
seriousness of the attack.” Raeder, supra note 8, at 1504.
132. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 94, at 124, 132.
133. Raeder, Double-Edged, supra note 125, at 794; Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and
Their Children: Lessons from One Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29, 57 (1998).
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herself or her children. The jurors are familiar with the idea that a victim will
minimize the extent of the violence that occurred to her or attempt to take
some of the blame for that violence. When a victim does not recant or
minimize the violence – and jurors are only permitted to hear about the isolated
incident – the victim, then, does not qualify as a true domestic violence victim.
The disconnect between the public perception of the battered woman and the
non-recanting victim often leads jurors to view the woman as vindictive, not as
a victim.
Rather than removing the defendant’s character from the trial, the character
evidence ban injects a false image of the defendant’s good character into the
trial. When the jury is precluded from hearing evidence of the defendant’s
prior battering, they cannot see the defendant as a batterer. The defendant can
hide behind the half-truth of his virtuousness-by-absence at the same time that
he attacks the victim’s character.134 The resulting disparity not only obscures
the true nature of domestic violence, but it does so in conjunction with jurors’
expectations about domestic violence victims and defendants.135
iii. Perpetuates Violence Against Women
Finally, the character evidence rule perpetuates the public-private
dichotomy and correspondingly, violence against women. As discussed above,
the rule denies the victim’s reality and hides the nature of domestic violence
from juries. The result is that fewer batterers are being held accountable.136
134. “By forbidding the use of evidence concerning the ongoing nature of abuse within the
relationship, the law denies reality, and asks the jury to do the same. There is no justice in this
formula.” Stuart H. Baggish & Christopher G. Frey, A Proposed Use for Evidence of Specific
Similar Acts in Criminal Prosecutions to Corroborate Victim Testimony, 68 FLA. B.J. 57, 59 (Oct.
1994).
135. Other writers agree that the rule frustrates the current understanding of the nature of
domestic violence as a cyclical series of actions by a batterer toward his victim. For example,
Raeder writes, “[The current rule] reflects a completely unsophisticated view of domestic
violence which flies in the face of the extensive literature discussing battering relationships.
Although each abusive act is different, it typically plays a part in a scheme aimed at obtaining
control over the victim.” Raeder, supra note 8, at 1492.
136. Scholars advocating a domestic violence exception to the character evidence prohibition
have asserted that batterers would hesitate to abuse their victim(s) if they knew they would be
tried, and more likely convicted, if prior conduct was more readily admissible against them. Rice,
supra note 4, at 957. Support for the deterrence factor of enhanced admissibility of prior
domestic violence conduct to achieve greater accountability for batterers may also be found in the
results of increased enforcement and publicity surrounding the crime of driving while intoxicated:
Not long ago, drunk driving was not viewed as serious criminal behavior. Instead, the
drunk drivers were treated sympathetically on the theory that anyone could commit the
offense. As a result, extremely low sentences were the norm. Yet, over time, led by
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, attitudes began to change. Today, when people attend
social events it is commonplace to designate a driver who will not drink. No longer do
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The rule disenfranchises victims by denying their reality, at the same time
that the rule allows the batterer to project a falsely positive, non-violent
character. The result is that the rule mimics some of the dynamics present in
domestic violent relationships to the disadvantage of women. Women are
more reluctant to return to a system that treated them in a fashion similar to
that of their abusers. Women often feel forced to endure the violence or seek
self-help.
The character evidence rule’s preservation of a public-private dichotomy
means that the private sphere remains shielded from legal action. Within this
private sphere, violence against women will continue to be considered a
private matter and not the appropriate business of the state. Because the vast
majority of victims are women, preserving the private sphere works profoundly
to the disadvantage of women. Women will continue to be beaten in
astounding numbers.
III. A CALL FOR A NEW RULE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
The current use of the character evidence rule in the domestic violence
context constitutes the legal system’s third means of protecting domestic
violence from effective prosecution. The character evidence ban has been a
part of the common law for centuries and is often described as one of the three
most important aspects of the Anglo-American legal system.137 A close
examination of the intellectual foundations for the rule suggests a change in the
rule for domestic violence cases.
A.

Wigmore and the Character Evidence Ban

In 1904, John Wigmore produced his ten-volume work, A Treatise on the
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law.138 Wigmore’s
work was hailed at the time as being one of the finest pieces of legal

judges give light sentences on the theory that the defendant was simply unlucky and not
blameworthy. Similarly, legislatures have enacted more stringent laws concerning arrest,
definition of offenses and mandatory sentencing, as well as required treatment programs.
Society now reflects zero tolerance for behavior which was once acceptable . . . So, too,
the publicity focused on domestic violence can be used to change attitudes.
Raeder, supra note 8, at 1482-83 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, Epilogue: Making
Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245, 1251 (1995)
[hereinafter Schneider, Epilogue]). See also Letendre, supra note 10, at 1003-04. “[The]
Washington domestic violence task force found that the law’s failure to address domestic
violence ‘directly and appropriately’ fosters continued abuse.” Id. (citing WASHINGTON STATE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 2 (1991)).
137. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16.
138. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW (1904).
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scholarship ever produced.139 Wigmore remains the “fundamental working
source for scholars, practitioners and courts.”140 In many respects, Wigmore is
the beginning and end of the discussion regarding a rule of evidence. Time
and again, legal scholarship pertaining to a rule of evidence grounds its
discussion in Wigmore. Exploration of the character evidence rule is no
exception.141
In attempting to discern the policy for the character evidence ban,
Wigmore reviewed cases from 1684 to 1921.142 He distilled from the cases
three primary arguments in support of the character evidence ban: the ban
prevents (1) undue prejudice, (2) unfair surprise, and (3) confusion of the
issues.143 Virtually every commentator quotes these same three rationales.144

139. Jon R. Waltz & Norman M. Garland, Book Review, Evidence in Trials at Common Law,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 402 (1971). See also Book Review, 39 AM. L. REV. 478 (1905) (Volumes III
& IV). The American University Law Review noted: “No one would ever dare to write on the
same subject except to make supplements thereto. Other writers may well study this work for
system and thoroughness in detail; and when they have done this they will doubtless stop in
despair.” Id.
140. Ronan E. Degnan, Book Review Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1590 (1974).
141. David P. Leonard, In Defense of Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the
Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1166 (1998). See also Susan Marlene
Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L.
BULL. 504, 504 (1991); Karen M. Fingar, And Justice For All: The Admissibility of Uncharged
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 501, 511 n.52, 531 n.190, 538 n.231 (1996); David J. Karp,
Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 15, 23 (1994); Raeder, supra note 8, at 1489.
142. Wigmore’s first volume came out in 1904-05. Later volumes contained cases dating to
1921.
143. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 418-19.
“The reasons thus marshaled in various forms are reducible to [four]: (1) The over-strong
tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person
to do such acts; (2) The tendency to condemn, not because he is believed guilty of the
present charge, but because he has escaped unpunished from other offenses; both of these
represent the principle of Undue Prejudice; (3) the injustice of attacking one necessarily
unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking evidence is fabricated; this represents the
principle of Unfair Surprise. It is also said, by some judges (4) that the Confusion of new
Issues is a reason for avoiding such evidence . . . .”
Id.
144. But see Karp, supra note 141, at 27 (noting that the concern over undue prejudice to the
defendant was not voiced in the cases most often cited when discussing the origins of the
character evidence prohibitions. Instead, he observes that the early decisions in Hampden’s Trial,
9 How. St. Tr. 1053 (K.B. 1684) and Harrison’s Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 833 (Old Bailey 1692),
reflected concern over unfair surprise and the need to limit the proceedings, not concern over
undue prejudice) (asserting that the absence of concern for undue prejudice in these cases
suggests that different reasons lay behind the establishment of the character evidence rule).
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In fact, it is difficult to find much analysis of the character evidence ban
beyond these three arguments.
Interestingly, Wigmore cast doubt on his own rationales. First, he asserts
that only the avoidance of undue prejudice has any support:
The policy of avoiding undue prejudice is based on weaknesses of human
nature which are today as obvious as ever. In criminal cases, this policy is one
of those that mark off the Anglo-American system from the rest of the
civilized world . . . . Our own rule represents a safeguard against a real danger
to which the search for truth will always be liable so long as the decision of
facts is committed to any but Solomons.145

Second, Wigmore noted that other evidentiary rules excluding extrinsic
evidence resolves confusion of the issues.146 Third, he stated that the policies
of preventing unfair surprise and confusion of the issues have been “greatly
overworked.”147 Fourth, he noted that the reasons he cited “represent general
policies and constant quantities in our law of Evidence, and reappear
individually in other parts of it.”148 Fifth, he suggested that judges have
misapplied the rule out of leniency for the defendant rather than to protect the
innocent.149 Finally, Wigmore lamented that the shortcomings of the rules of
evidence derive primarily from a lack of acquaintance with legal history,
philosophy, and jurisprudence.150 Wigmore asserts that:
Another shortcoming is the over-emphasis on the technique of legal rules in
detail, with corresponding under-emphasis on policies, reasons, and principles.
This is a difficult thing to describe to those who do not sense it without
description; but it is very marked. It is the kind of thing that is like the dead
bark on the outside of a tree, in contrast to the living, growing inner core. Too
much of our law is dead bark, – at least in the judicial opinions. Two thirds or
more of them are needless, – dry repetitions of well-settled things. The
treatment tends to become mechanical. Reasons are lost from sight. The new
generation of judges thus never hears the reasons. And so gradually “you
cannot see the forest for the trees.”151

The first step in vitalizing the character evidence rule, therefore, is to
review the history of the rule and reasons which support it.
B.

History of the Character Evidence Ban

145. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 8a, at 131-32.
146. Id. § 194, at 419. Wigmore does not refer to the rules regarding character or
impeachment of witness, although he appears to be discussing these rules.
147. Id. § 8a, at 132.
148. Id. § 194, at 419.
149. Id. § 194, at 419-20.
150. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 8a, at 115.
151. Id. § 8a, at 117.
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The American character evidence rule derives from the English common
law and was imported into this country from England prior to the American
Revolution. The history in England is difficult to trace, but what is present
suggests a growing trend through the seventeenth century toward acceptance of
the character evidence ban. Wigmore cited evidence that character evidence
was widely used in English courts during the 1600s.152 He also noted,
however, several cases toward the end of that century in which prior bad act
evidence was not admissible.153 In 1684, a court refused evidence of a
defendant’s prior forgeries during his forgery trial.154 In 1692, in the case of
Harrison’s Trial, the court rejected prior bad act evidence during the
defendant’s murder trial, stating, “Are you going to arraign his whole life?”155
While he acknowledged that the practice of using the defendant’s character
“died hard and slowly,” Wigmore asserted that the character evidence ban was
a settled rule by the end of the 1600s:156
In early practice this class of evidence [prior bad acts of the defendant] was
resorted to without limitation. But for more than two centuries, ever since the
liberal reaction which began with the Restoration of the Stuarts, this policy of
exclusion, in one or another of its reasonings, has received judicial sanction,
more emphatic with time and experience. It represents a revolution in the
theory of criminal trials, and is one of the peculiar features, of vast moment,
which distinguishes the Anglo-American from the Continental system of
Evidence.157

During the colonial period, American courts appear to have followed their
English counterparts in precluding prior bad act evidence. For example, in
1763, the Massachusetts Supreme Court precluded evidence pertaining to the
defendant’s prior misconduct.158 Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest
that the character evidence rule was becoming firmly established in America

152. Id. § 194, at 415 n.1.
153. Id. at 416. Modern scholars have asserted that the character evidence ban can be traced
to the waning of feudalism in England and the development of industrialization. See also
Leonard, supra note 141, at 1193; Fingar, supra note 141, at 510; Thomas J. Reed, Trial by
Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN.
L. REV. 713, 717 (1981).
154. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 416 (discussing Hampden’s Trial, 9 How. St. Tr.
1053, 1103 (1684)).
155. Id. § 194, at 416.
156. Id. § 194, at 416 n.1; id. § 8, at 109. But see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF
ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 180, 190-96 (2003). Langbein argues that Wigmore placed the
adoption of the character evidence rule too early. Langbein suggests that the rule gained
acceptance from 1684 to 1714 and was not fully established until 1744. Id. at 195-96.
157. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16 (emphasis added).
158. Rex v. Doaks, Quincy’s Mass. 90 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1763).
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after the Revolution.159 Evidence scholars report cases from the early 1800s
that employed the character evidence rule.160 By 1891, the rule had become so
firmly entrenched that the United States Supreme Court stated:
Proof of [prior crimes] only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors,
to draw their minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression
that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the community, and
who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the
trial of human beings . . . . However depraved in character, and however full
of crime their past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried
upon competent evidence, and only for the offense charged.161

The universality of the acceptance of the character evidence rule can also
be circumstantially established through the strength of statements endorsing
the rule. In 1901, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
This [character evidence ban] rule, so universally recognized and so firmly
established in all English-speaking lands, is rooted in that jealous regard for
the liberty of the individual which has distinguished our jurisprudence from all
others, at least from the birth of the Magna Charta. It is the product of that
same humane and enlightened public spirit which, speaking through our
common-law, has decreed that every person charged with the commission of a
crime shall be protected by the presumption of innocence until he has been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.162

More recently, courts have equated the character evidence rule with the
presumption of innocence.163
The character evidence rule was formally embodied into FRE 404 by the
United States Supreme Court in 1972 with the adoption of the Federal Rules of

159. Two important issues need to be raised at this point. The character evidence ban is not
absolute, and it does not apply to the parties equally. The rule precluding evidence of the
defendant’s character was limited to that evidence which would show the defendant acted in
conformity with his character. Therefore, exceptions were created to allow admission of evidence
of the defendant’s character when it was either at issue in the dispute or if the evidence
established something other than conformity with the character. Secondly, the character evidence
ban does not apply equally to the parties. In a criminal case, the ban on character evidence
generally does not include the character of the victim. In fact, the rules allowed and encouraged
the admission of the victim’s character. The victim’s character has been and continues to be an
important component of many trials, especially domestic violence trials. See supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 141, at 1170 (citing SAMUEL MARCH PHILLIPPS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 70 n.b (London, J. Butterworth & Son 1814)).
161. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892).
162. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901).
163. United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Evidence.164 Contemporary commentators have traced the history of FRE 404
and the ban on character.165 These commentators generally concur with
Wigmore that the character evidence ban has been universally accepted in the
United States since the time of the American Revolution.166 One scholar posits
that the character evidence ban is “one of the oldest principles of AngloAmerican law” and that the “rule’s longevity can be measured in terms of
centuries rather than only years or decades.”167 Another author writes:
164. The United States Supreme Court’s adoption of the rules of evidence in 1972 culminated
nearly a dozen years of work on the issue. In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States
authorized Chief Justice Warren to study the feasibility of promulgating uniform rules of
evidence. After an initial study into whether uniform evidence rules were advisable, an advisory
committee was appointed in 1965 to propose uniform rules. By 1969, the committee submitted
proposed rules for comments. The Supreme Court adopted the rules in 1972, and Congress
passed them in 1975. See William L. Hungate, Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. Rep. No. 93650, at 2-3 (1973). Interestingly, the process of developing the uniform rules occurred before the
most significant advances of the Battered Women’s Movement. Therefore, while the adoption of
the uniform rules might have been an opportunity to address the appropriateness of FRE 404 in
the domestic violence context, the model rule was adopted before the developments that began to
question the impact of the rules of evidence.
165. Drew D. Dropkin & James H. McComas, Article, On a Collision Course: Pure
Propensity Evidence and Due Process in Alaska, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 177, 179, 188-96 (2001);
Leonard, supra note 141.
166. But see Karp, supra note 141, at 28 (discussing certain debates over ratification of the
U.S. Constitution that included issues of character evidence). Regarding the “same vicinage”
requirement, Patrick Henry extolled the virtues of character evidence at trial:
Will gentlemen tell me the trial by a jury of the vicinage where the party resides is
preserved? . . . [T]his state . . . is so large that your juries may be collected five hundred
miles from where the party resides – no neighbors who are acquainted with their
characters, their good or bad conduct in life, to judge of the unfortunate man . . . By the
bill of rights of England, a subject has a right to a trial by his peers. What is meant by his
peers? Those who reside near him, his neighbors, and who are well acquainted with his
character and situation in life. Is this secured in the proposed plan before you? No sir.
III JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT’S DEBATES 578-79 (1836).
167. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1162-64. Interestingly, political opposition to changes to the
rule has sometimes led to exaggerated claims about the longevity of the character evidence rule.
In 1994 President Bill Clinton signed into law the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, which contained provisions that significantly changed Fed. R. Evid. 404 and created
exceptions for admissibility of evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault and child molestation
prosecutions. Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing
The Credibility Quotient, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 108 (1995). Senator Joseph Biden voiced
opposition to the character evidence exceptions when he asserted that the rule had developed
from “800 years . . . under our English jurisprudence system” and should not be changed by
legislative action “to blind people to looking at the real facts before them and making an
independent judgment.” Id. at 119 (quoting 139 Cong. Rec. S15020-01, S15072 (daily ed. Nov.
4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Biden)). Based on other scholarly research, it seems safe to conclude
that Senator Biden’s historical tracings of the character evidence rule can be relegated to the
category of political hyperbole.
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The historical evidence supporting exclusion of pure propensity evidence is
compelling. From the days of England’s Glorious Revolution until the present
day, courts have demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the principle that
pure propensity evidence should not be admitted, fearing that juries will infer
present guilt from previous conduct. Beginning in the late 1600s, courts in
England – and eventually pre-colonial America as well – recognized the threat
to fairness created by pure propensity evidence and sought to exclude it from
criminal trials. The principle has enjoyed longstanding status as a fundamental
principle of American criminal justice.168

C. Beyond Wigmore: Intellectual Foundations for the Character Evidence
Rule
Following Wigmore, it is possible to narrow the search for the intellectual
foundations of the character evidence rule to the hundred years from the
Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 to the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
However, to truly understand the intellectual foundations for the character
evidence rule, one must move beyond Wigmore. During this hundred year
period, England and America experienced the birth of liberalism, the rise of
modern science, the final rejection of virtue ethics, the development of the
Enlightenment, and a breakdown in social stratification.169 It was in the
cauldron of these five developments in intellectual history that the creation of

168. Dropkin, supra note 165, at 190-91.
169. Leonard argues that the historical, religious, and philosophical roots of the character
evidence rule are the breakdown in social stratification due to industrialization and urbanization
in England, the rise of Calvinism, and the moral philosophy of Kant. See Leonard, supra note
141, at 1193-1200. While Leonard identified several important aspects, his treatment of even the
important aspects is limited. He failed to fully grasp the importance of the rise of science and the
rejection of virtue ethics. Leonard focuses on Calvinism and predestination. In this, he misses
the broader implications of the Reformation and the changing nature of the individual’s
relationship to God, church, society, and the state. Leonard also views the breakdown of social
stratification as due to industrialization. This misses the importance of the social and religious
changes stemming from the Reformation. In addition, Leonard fails to confine himself to the
period of time during which the character evidence rule was established. For example, Leonard
relies on the writings of Kant. Kant, however, wrote The Metaphysics of Morals in 1797, well
after the establishment of the character evidence rule. Also, Leonard cites to industrialization in
America which did not occur until after the Civil War. Again, this is long after the character
evidence rule was adopted in American common law. While industrialization in England did
contribute to the breakdown of social hierarchy, it was but one factor. Also, industrialization
occurred long after the establishment of the rule. In fact, Leonard cites to Weber who posits that
industrialization was contingent upon the Protestant ethic. Further, the breakdown of social
stratification that occurred in America was not driven by industrialization. Rather, it reflects the
social and religious changes stemming from the Reformation. For further explication, see infra
notes 171-262 and accompanying text.
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the character evidence ban was born and in context of which the character
evidence ban makes intellectual sense.170
1. The Birth of Liberalism
When Wigmore spoke of the “liberal reaction which began with the
Restoration of the Stuarts,”171 he was referring to the reign of Charles II which
ran from 1660 to 1685. In 1660, Charles II returned to the monarchy in
England, ending the civil wars of the preceding hundred years and laying the
groundwork for two major advances in intellectual history: the seeds of the
liberal state and the rise of modern science.
The roots of the liberal state can be evidenced in three aspects of Charles
II’s reign. First, as a condition of his return to power, Charles II issued the
Declaration of Brea.172 Central to the Declaration of Brea was the agreement
to guarantee liberty of conscience.173 In an attempt to end the political
upheavals surrounding the wars of religion, Charles II advanced the notion of
toleration of religious differences.174 This notion of tolerance gave birth to the
separation of church and state. As historian George Trevelyan noted:
The division of the religious world into Church and Dissent made freedom of
thought a possibility for the future. The English could not be argued into
toleration by their reason, but they could be forced into it by their feuds . . . .
Thus the laws of the . . . Parliament [during Charles II’s reign] . . . have helped
to secure freedom for a hundred religions, and a thousand ways of thought.175

A second critical component of the developing liberal state was freedom of
speech. Prior to Charles II, freedom of speech, even in Parliament, had been
curtailed.176 Charles II restored the freedom of speech within Parliament and
the country.177
Critics of Government policy can hardly be said to have had any liberty of
person or speech guaranteed to them under the old Tudor and Stuart regime,
except in the case of defined privileges, uncertainly enjoyed, within the walls
of Parliament; but after the Restoration men no longer talked in whispers.178

170. The five developments are inter-related; for purposes of clarity, I discuss each
individually.
171. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16.
172. G.N. CLARK, THE LATER STUARTS: 1660-1714, at 3 (1934).
173. Id.
174. GODFREY DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS: 1603-1660, at 255 (1937).
175. GEORGE M. TREVELYAN, ENGLAND UNDER THE STUARTS 346 (1912). See also
WILLIAM CECIL DAMPIER, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH PHILOSOPHY AND
RELIGION 109 (1966).
176. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 163-64.
177. Id. at 339.
178. Id.
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The right of speech, particularly of dissent, was critical to the future of the
liberal state.179
Lastly, Charles II abolished the Star Chamber.180 The Star Chamber had
been a special government court which punished political opponents of the
King. The judges in the Star Chamber were politicians, and they had
extraordinary powers, unconstrained by the rules of procedure and evidence
that existed in the ordinary courts.181 The abolition of the Star Chamber182 had
three important impacts. First, it contributed to the movement toward
recognition of free speech.183 Second, the abolition recognized the importance
of a separation between the executive and the judiciary.184 Lastly, the abolition
advanced the belief that the law and the courts applied equally to all persons.185
As Trevelyan notes, after the abolition of the Star Chamber, “The law of the
land judged impartially all cases between officials and private citizens, and
there was no longer a prerogative law and a special court to which Government
could, as in other lands and in earlier times, appeal.”186
Interestingly, it was these steps of Charles II’s which sowed the seeds for
the birth of liberalism. But, liberalism also grew out of the political upheavals
surrounding the religious wars in Europe after the Reformation.187 Here, the
aim was to justify the creation of a secular state that could coexist with
divergent religious beliefs. Toleration, freedom of individual choice, and the
absence of a state-determined conception of the good life were critical
components of liberalism. 188 On this view, liberalism has been defined as the

179. Id. at 346.
180. Id. at 339.
181. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 164-65.
182. Some scholars have observed that the ban on character evidence originated as a direct
procedural response to the inquisitorial practices of the Star Chamber. See Rice, supra note 4, at
945 (citing Edward G. Mascolo, Uncharged-Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent:
Limiting the Need for Admissibility, 67 CONN. B.J. 281, 283-84 (1993)).
183. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 166.
184. Id. “There could indeed be no more complete and dangerous example of merging the
judiciary with the executive.” Id.
185. CLARK, supra note 172, at 9.
186. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 339.
187. RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 41-42 (1999);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv (1993).
188. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1982). Sandel defines
liberalism as the belief that:
[S]ociety, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and
conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not
themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good; what justifies these
regulative principles above all is not that they maximize the social welfare or otherwise
promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category
given prior to the good and independent of it.
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shared public values that determine the fundamental terms of political and
social cooperation.189 Liberalism is thus concerned with structuring state
institutions to allow individuals the opportunity to flourish in individual
ways.190 Primarily, liberalism demands that the government allow and protect
individuals’ freedom of choice as to religious preference, social relations, and
economic commitments.191
Consistent with its historical foundations, liberalism in America
incorporated the concept of separation of church and state, religious freedom
and toleration, and freedom of speech. In addition, the Constitution embodied
both liberalism’s emphasis on protecting individual rights and the development
of institutions that allow for personal freedom.192
2. Rise of Modern Science
The second lasting contribution of the reign of Charles II was his
contribution to the birth of modern science. In 1662, Charles II formed the
Royal Society and lent state credibility and support to the organization.193 The
Royal Society’s early members were Issac Newton,194 John Locke,195 and
Robert Boyle,196 among others.197 As Peter Gay described:
The Royal Society lived up to its name. It held meetings to encourage
scientific inquiry, engaged in correspondence in aid of the “new philosophy,”
and reported on experiments, discoveries, and inventions in its famous
publication, Philosophical Transactions. Every prominent natural philosopher

Id. (emphasis in original). John Rawls defines a “conception of the good” as a “comprehensive
doctrine.” See RAWLS, supra note 187, at 13, 175. For Rawls, a state-advanced conception of
the good is synonymous with state policies that advance a comprehensive doctrine. Id. at 223.
189. Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1205 (1992) (citing Rawls’s conceptions of liberalism).
190. HARDIN, supra note 187, at 1.
191. Id. at 6.
192. Goldfarb, supra note 67, at 34-35.
193. GEORGE H. DANIELS, SCIENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIAL HISTORY 38 (1971);
A. WOLF, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE 16TH & 17TH
CENTURIES 60 (1950). The charter of the Royal Society called for the creation of society devoted
to the pursuit of experimental knowledge. Id. For a general discussion of the role of the Royal
Society in the “scientific colonization” of the American colonies, see DANIELS, supra, at 30-46.
194. CLARK, supra note 172, at 359. Newton discovered the law of gravity and settled the
main principles of mathematics, physics, astronomy, and optics once and for all. Id.
195. Id. at 370-71. Locke was a central figure in Enlightenment thought and published
several works that were instrumental in the creation of the American Republic. See 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 519 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
196. CLARK, supra note 172, at 360. Boyle discovered “the relation between the volume,
density, and pressure of gases,” commonly referred to as Boyle’s Law. Boyle’s law was critical
in the development of the steam engine. Id.
197. Id. at 28-29.
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in England belonged to it, and so did many distinguished scientists on the
Continent. So, too, did gifted amateurs like the diarist Samuel Pepys, the
American clergyman Cotton Mather, and the American statesman-scientist
Benjamin Franklin. The list of its Fellows is a list of the leaders of the
Scientific Revolution . . . .198

The Royal Society in London was one of several scientific societies founded in
the seventeenth century.199 These societies played a critical role in the
development of modern science because they were not limited by the
authorized epistemologies of either the universities or the churches.200 These
societies contributed to an amazing breadth of fields, including astronomy,
physics, anatomy, botany, mathematics, agriculture, social sciences,
mechanics, electronics, chemistry, geology, medicine, textiles, mining,
psychology, and geography.201
The establishment of the Royal Society, and the other scientific societies,
brought about the development of the scientific method.202 It was during this
period of time that the “[s]pecial activity which we call scientific began to be a
leading element in European thought. That activity is one of unbiased inquiry,
shrinking from no conclusion merely because it is unorthodox. It is also
positive and experimental: it tests its conclusions not only by reasoning but
also by observation.”203 The scientific method is premised on the ability of
individuals to observe the world through their own eyes and to interpret their
observations using their own intelligence.204 Specifically, the scientific
method emphasizes observation, experience, experiment, and a commitment to
cause and effect.205 Importantly, the scientific method focused on how things
worked rather than why things worked.206 The emphasis was on placing the
item in its proper context within the physical world.207

198. PETER GAY, AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 17 (1966).
199. WOLF, supra note 193, at 54-55. The Accademia del Cimento was also founded in
Florence in 1657 and the Academie des Sciences in Paris in 1666. Id. at 8-9.
200. Id. at 54-55.
201. See generally id.
202. GAY, supra note 198, at 19-20. Gay credits Isaac Newton with cementing the scientific
method as the primary mode of inquiry of the Enlightenment and beyond. Id.
203. CLARK, supra note 172, at 27. See also L. W. H. HULL, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 194 (1965) (describing the scientific method as a “subtle blend of observation,
hypothesis, mathematics and planned experiment”).
204. WOLF, supra note 193, at 54.
205. Id. at 4-5; see also GAY, supra note 198, at 20; HULL, supra note 203, at 191-195; Mark
Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 412 (1995).
206. SIR WILLIAM CECIL DAMPIER, A HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH
PHILOSOPHY & RELIGION 146 (1966).
207. Id.
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An important aspect of the scientific method and the rise of modern
science was the “secularization of knowledge.”208 Prior to the Reformation,
knowledge, including science, was deemed to be divinely revealed by the
Catholic Church.209 During the religious wars following the Reformation,
many intellectuals became frustrated with the authoritarian positions of
churches. In addition, the concept of toleration undermined the position of the
Catholic Church – or any church – as the sole source of knowledge.210 As a
result, a growing number of individuals sought knowledge of the world
through the use of reason, rather than divination.211 This process contributed
to the general freedom of individuals to use reason to assess their own
world.212
As Treveleyan noted, the impact of the scientific movement reached far
beyond science:
The secular reaction among the libertines of life and politics at the capital
would not have outlasted the generation that had suffered under Oliver
[Cromwell], if it had not become joined to the more solid and respectable
influence of a scientific movement springing up in the same time and place.
The Royal Society was Royal in more than name . . . Charles II extended an
intelligent patronage to science, when the time was ripe; bigotry could never
exile nor years efface the native achievements of Newtonian discovery; while
the idea of the rule of law in the universe slowly penetrated downwards from
class to class, remoulding by unopposed and unsuspected influence the
unconscious forms of thought, and even of religion itself.213

Primarily because of the relationship between England and the American
colonies, the impact of the scientific movement was strongly felt in America
prior to the American Revolution.214 Many colonial Americans became
members of the Royal Society of London.215 In addition, several scientific
societies, such as the American Philosophical Society, were founded in the

208. WOLF, supra note 193, at 8.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see also GAY, supra note 198, at 31 (asserting that the “claim of Christianity to be
the one true faith was thrown into doubt” by the secularizing impact of global exploration and
greater interaction with non-Western civilizations).
211. WOLF, supra note 193, at 8; see also GAY, supra note 198, at 31, 40 (discussing how a
greater number of religious leaders themselves employed “rational inquiry” to examine the
history of religion).
212. HULL, supra note 203, at 185. “Men began to see that by applying their own intelligence
they might make for themselves an oracle wiser and less capricious than that of Delphi, and so
command their fate more fully than ever before.” Id.
213. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 347.
214. DANIELS, supra note 193, at 47.
215. Id. at 50.
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fledgling colonies.216 Benjamin Franklin stated that the purpose of the
Philosophical Society was to “let light into the nature of things and tend to
increase the power of man over matter, and multiply the conveniences or
pleasures of life.”217 The American scientific societies modeled themselves
after their British counterparts and dedicated themselves to the scientific
method.218 The language of the Declaration of Independence emphasizes the
extent to which the notions of individual use of reason had permeated
American thought.219
After the War of Independence, American commitment to scientific
inquiry redoubled.220 Many Americans emphasized the connection between
freedom from England and intellectual freedom:
[The] introduction and progress of freedom have generally attended the
introduction and progress of letters and science. In despotick governments the
people are mostly illiterate, rude, and uncivilized; but in states where civil
liberty hath been cherished, the human mind hath generally proceeded in
improvement, – learning and knowledge have prevailed, and the arts and
sciences have flourished.221

216. Id. at 66-68, 106-07 (discussing the various efforts to establish scientific societies in
America prior to the Revolution, particular the American Philosophical Society).
217. Id. at 106.
218. Id. at 107.
219. “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See also,
SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 120 (1994). This is also an
example of the extent to which the ideals of the Enlightenment were incorporated into America.
See infra notes 222-34 and accompanying text.
220. DANIELS, supra note 193, at 126-27.
221. Id. at 128 (quoting John Gardiner).
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3. Enlightenment Philosophy
The Age of Enlightenment is generally considered to have started in the
late seventeenth century and run into the middle of the nineteenth century.
Some historians mark the beginning of the Enlightenment with Isaac Newton
publishing the Principia Mathematica in 1687,222 others with the adoption of
the Bill of Rights following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England.223 A
detailed discussion of the complexities of the Enlightenment is beyond the
scope of this article.224 However, there are several ideas which run
consistently through much of Enlightenment thought and which found
prominence in colonial and revolutionary America.
Enlightenment thinkers believed in the existence of an objective truth or
reality.225 They asserted the preeminence of the rational mind226 and
committed themselves to the discovery of the objective truth through the
rigorous use of the rational mind, including the scientific method of
observation and attention to cause and effect.227 The belief in a discoverable
objective reality, coupled with the breakdown of the status society,228 led to the
notion that people should be judged by their actions and not their position held
as an accident of birth.
In addition, the Enlightenment was characterized by optimism about
human nature and its possibilities.229 Enlightenment thinkers viewed people as
essentially good and able to use their reason to advance themselves and society
toward greater equality and liberty.230 This optimism is evident in the
222. GAY, supra note 198, at 12.
223. ROY PORTER, THE CREATION OF THE MODERN WORLD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT 27 (2000).
224. Much has been written about the history of the Enlightenment. Indeed, it is facetious to
suggest that there is one thing called the Enlightenment. The ideas proposed are varied and often
contradictory.
225. Cammack, supra note 205, at 411-12.
226. The Enlightenment advanced the idea that the individual could make their own inquiries
about the nature of the world, independent of religious or state constraints or constructs. See John
Jackson and Sean Doran, Evidence, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 172 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
227. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL
INTERROGATIONS 2 (1991).
The theoretical discourses of modernity from Descartes through the Enlightenment and its
progeny championed reason as the source of progress in knowledge and society, as well
as the privileged locus of truth and the foundation of systematic knowledge. Reason was
deemed competent to discover adequate theoretical and practical norms upon which
systems of thought and action could be built and society could be restructured.
Id.
228. See infra notes 250-61 and accompanying text.
229. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 195, at 521.
230. See id. at 519.
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commitment to the use of reason and the individual’s ability to discern that
objective truth. In fact, the Enlightenment has been described as a
“metaphysics of the ‘sound common sense.’”231
According to Enlightenment thinkers, the ability of every human being to
fully employ his or her reason had been constrained by the forces of church,
state, social and economic class, superstition, ignorance, and prejudice.232 One
of the objectives of the Enlightenment was to clear these obstacles from the
individual’s path toward realization of each person’s full potential, primarily
through education.233 Importantly, the Enlightenment viewed progress of both
the individual and society as virtually unlimited.234
4. The Rejection of Virtue Ethics
Prior to the Reformation in Europe, the concept of morality – deeming an
action to be appropriate or inappropriate235 – derived primarily from the Greek
notion of virtue.236 Aristotle defined virtue as “state involving rational choice,
consisting in a mean relative to us and determined by reason – the reason, that
is, by reference to which the practically wise person would determine it.”237
Virtue included the concept of an individual’s character, but it also embraced
an individual’s role in a hierarchical social structure.238 To be virtuous was to
perform a particular and specific function within society: a king had certain
virtues – for instance, an ability to command – that were contingent on his
place in society.239 A person’s character, therefore, was a function of his or her
allotted role in society, be it king, soldier, or wife, and not of their decisions or
actions. Greek society was rigidly hierarchical.240 An individual’s role in
Greek society was permanently established by his or her nature at birth. The
social setting into which one was born determined one’s social function, one’s

231. 2 WILHELM WINDELBAND, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: RENAISSANCE,
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND MODERN 438 (1958).
232. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 195, at 520.
233. Id. at 521.
234. Id.
235. I use the terms appropriate and inappropriate to avoid the difficulties of the term “good”
and “bad.” Also, appropriate and inappropriate allow for comparison of pre-Reformation
morality based on virtue ethics and post-Reformation morality based on individual psychology.
236. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8 (2d ed. 1998).
237. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book II, ch. 6 (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000).
238. MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 8.
239. Id.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 250-62 (discussing the transformation of American
society from hierarchical monarchism to republicanism and democracy).
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position in relation to superior and inferior persons, and one’s obligations and
duties to superiors.241
The Greek notion of virtue survived the rise of Christianity; indeed, it was
incorporated into Christianity primarily through the theology of Aquinas.242
Western Europe, therefore:
[I]nherited from the Greeks and from Christianity a moral vocabulary in which
to judge an action good was to judge it to be the action of a good man, and to
judge a man good was to judge him as manifesting dispositions (virtues) which
enabled him to play a certain kind of role in a certain kind of social life.243

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought a radical transformation
in the understanding of virtue, morality, and character.244 With the advent of
the Reformation and capitalism, the relationship of the individual to society
experienced significant changes.245 Reformation thought insisted on personal
judgment and individual responsibility regarding one’s relationship to God, as
opposed to strict obedience to ecclesiastical authority.246 As a consequence of
greater individualism, people sought a morality, not based on the dictates of
Christianity but based on reason and experience.247
In addition to changes in the relationship of the individual to the church,
society itself underwent significant structural changes. Rigid social hierarchy
began to break down, and with it the traditional ties of duty and obligation
Individuals experienced greater personal
were “fatally loosened.”248
autonomy. This transformation led to:
[A] move from the well-defined simplicities of the morality of role fulfillment,
where we judge a man as farmer, as king, as father, to the point at which
evaluation has become detached, both in the vocabulary and in practice, from
roles, and we ask not what it is to be good at or for this or that role or skill, but
just what it is to be “a good man”; not what it is to do one’s duty as clergyman
or landowner, but as “a man.”249

As a result of these changes, individuals felt freer to determine for
themselves the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular action.
This determination rested more on resonance with personal experience and
241. See MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 8, 156.
242. Id. at 117.
243. Id. at 166.
244. Id. at 156.
245. Id. at 167.
246. HENRY SIDGWICK, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS 15354 (1949).
247. Id. at 157.
248. MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 156. This transformation is more fully explored infra at
notes 250-62 and accompanying text.
249. MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 94 (emphasis in original).
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individual reason than on religious doctrine. The resulting rejection of a
virtue-based objective value system generated a pluralism of moral belief and
the inability of individuals to agree as to which settled dispositions should be
considered “virtuous.” Moreover, with the focus turned to individual
autonomy, not surprisingly the focus of morality turned to action rather than
disposition.
5. The Breakdown of Social Stratification
The period of time between 1660 and the creation of the American
republic saw a dramatic change in the nature of English and American
societies: the transition from monarchy to democracy.250 This transition
completely changed the relationships of individuals to each other and to the
state.
The Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 was a restoration of the monarchy in
England. In addition, it was an extension of the traditional social hierarchy.251
English monarchical society was rigidly hierarchical.252 There were no
modern conceptions of the separation between society and state, or public and
private.253 The divine right of kings established a direct link from God to the
king.254 The king was the head of the state, the church, and the society, and all
owed allegiance to the king.255 As David Hume wrote, monarchy was “a long

250. Contrary to popular belief, the breakdown in social hierarchy took place primarily
without industrialization, particularly in America. WOOD, supra note 52, at 7.
251. TREVELYAN, supra note 175, at 332-33.
252. See DAVIES, supra note 174, at 264-72 (discussing the hierarchy of royalty, nobility,
country gentry, landlords, and tenants that existed in England prior to the restoration of Charles
II). Davies explains how the concept of “paternal rule” was commonplace and founded on
dependence of tenants. Id. at 266. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *396-407. Blackstone
details the division of the society into nobility and commonality. Id. at 396. He further
graphically represents this division with a “Table of Precedence,” which goes from the king’s
children to laborers. Id. at 405-06.
253. WOOD, supra note 52, at 81.
254. ROSS HARRISON, HOBBES, LOCKE, AND CONFUSION’S MASTERPIECE: AN
EXAMINATION OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 2-4 (2003). Harrison cites
to speeches of James I from 1610, in which he stated that “Kings are justly called gods, for that
they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth.” Id. at 2. Blackstone
disputed that there was a divine right of kings. He felt that the rights of the kings were inherited.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *191.
255. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *366-67. “Allegiance is the tie, or ligament, which
binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the subject” Id.
See also WOOD, supra note 52, at 11-12 (discussing that the king was the head of the nation and
that to be a subject was to be “personally subordinated to a paternal dominion”).
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train of dependence from the prince to the peasant.”256 Inherent within
hierarchy is inequality.257
As has already been discussed, one of the consequences of the
Reformation was that the need for an intermediary between the individual and
God was challenged. After the Reformation, individuals were free to make
their own relationship to God. This not only affected the role of the church in
society, it also affected the position of the monarchy. The impact on the
monarchy was furthered by those same efforts which gave birth to liberalism,
namely the recognition of religious toleration, freedom of conscience, freedom
of speech, and the separation of church and state:258
Among the monarchies of Europe, the English possessed by far the most
republican constitution . . . . Already by the beginning of the [eighteenth]
century the English monarchy had lost much of its sacred aura. The man-made
dynastic alterations of 1688 and 1714 and the rationalizing of religion
inevitably weakened the sense of hereditary mystique, and the restrictions
Parliament placed on the crown’s prerogatives and finances diminished the
king’s ability to act independently.259

The gradual replacement of monarchy with republicanism:
challenged the primary assumptions and practices of monarchy – its hierarchy,
its inequality, its devotion to kinship, its patriarchy, its patronage, and its
dependency. It offered new conceptions of the individual, the family, the state,
and the individual’s relationship to the family, the state, and other individuals.
Indeed, republicanism offered nothing less than new ways of organizing
society. It defied and dissolved the older monarchical connections and
presented people with alternative kinds of attachments, new sorts of social
relationships. It transformed monarchical culture and prepared the way for the
revolutionary upheavals at the end of the eighteenth century.260

This transition from hierarchy to a more egalitarian society was most
dramatic in America. Colonial society was largely hierarchical.261 During the
American Revolution, republican ideals had permeated American society and
the Revolution contributed to the replacement of hierarchy with egalitarianism,
inherited status with ability, and stratification with an ideal of upward mobility
and individual self-fulfillment.262
256. David Hume, The Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in DAVID HUME’S
POLITICAL ESSAYS 120 (Charles W. Hendel ed. 1953).
257. WOOD, supra note 52, at 19.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 171-92.
259. WOOD, supra note 52, at 98.
260. Id. at 96-97.
261. Lerner, supra note 51, at 127 (discussing the particular impact of this hierarchical
structure on women and their resulting position of inferiority and subordination).
262. Id.
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D. Manifestations of These Intellectual Developments within the Rule
The birth of liberalism, the Enlightenment, the rise of modern science, the
rejection of virtue ethics, and the breakdown of social stratification all
occurred during the hundred years from 1660 to 1776. In light of this history,
it is not surprising that this same time period witnessed dramatic shifts in the
nature of criminal trials, changed conceptions about the role of juries, and the
establishment of the character evidence rule. Although a discussion of these
broader social and intellectual changes is missing from the cases establishing
the character evidence rule, it is possible to observe aspects of all five of the
major developments in the rule itself, particularly as the rule is established in
America.
The philosophies of the Enlightenment played a significant role in the
creation of the American republic and informed much of the ideology
surrounding the American Revolution.263 The character evidence rule
embodies Enlightenment philosophy’s emphasis on objective truth and its
corresponding rejection of a person’s private character as an important aspect
The scientific movement’s emphasis on
of legal decision-making.264
observable action265 and the Reformation’s emphasis on the ability of the
individual to independently determine the significance of an action266 are also
reflected in the rule. Finally, the character evidence rule reflects important
concepts of liberalism.
Manifestations of Enlightenment thought can be found throughout the
political and intellectual history of Europe and the United States. Those ideals,
however, found particularly fertile soil in the United States. Indeed,
Enlightenment ideas fostered significant aspects of the American
Revolution.267 For example, the rejection of the importance of private
character as evidenced by social position and social stratification was central to
the American Revolution and the radical nature of the American experiment.268
At the same time, the Enlightenment emphasized scientific observation of the
objective world.269 Here are the early seeds of the emerging conception of a
separation between public action and private character.
Significantly, these concepts found their way into the American jury trial
and were important in transforming the trial from an exploration of the
character of the parties to an objective search for the truth regarding the

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

COLIN BONWICK, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 51-52 (1991).
Leonard, supra note 141, at 1194-96.
Cammack, supra note 205, at 412-13.
See SIDGWICK, supra note 246, at 154.
BONWICK, supra note 263, at 51-52.
WOOD, supra note 52, at 3-8.
Cammack, supra note 205, at 411-12.
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parties’ actions.270 In fact, it was the legal system’s adoption of the
Enlightenment’s focus on the objective that led to the modern conception of a
trial. 271 Prior to the Enlightenment, jury trials consisted primarily of the
production of witnesses to swear to the character of the parties. The trial was
not about the facts of the dispute; rather, it focused on demonstration of good
character of the parties.272 The pre-Reformation conception of trials was, of
course, consistent with pre-Reformation virtue ethics.
The modern trial mimics several of the Enlightenment’s central tenets.
First, the trial can be seen as a rational search for the truth based upon the
In addition, the trial reflects an
observation of objective facts.273
Enlightenment optimism in the ability of the jury to achieve that truth.274 The
significant aspect of this is that certain types of proof were deemed appropriate
for sound and just decision-making, and others were not.275 Thus, the rules of
evidence developed to protect the process of the trial from being subverted by
inappropriate methods of proof. 276 The preclusion of hearsay and methods of
authentication of documents are two such examples. The trial, as guided by
the developing rules of evidence, sought to focus on the objective truth
discernible through “scientific” methods.277
The ban on character evidence, with its corresponding shift from the
subjective to the objective, was one of the most significant rules of evidence in

270. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1194-96.
271. See id. at 1195-96.
It was the embrace of the Enlightenment idea that the private and public lives of people
should be separated, and that in their public existence, people should be judged not
according to who they are but by their deeds . . . . The increasingly anonymous and
complex social and economic lives of the growing urban classes therefore mandated a
different conception of personal responsibility. Because the absence of information made
it no longer possible for people to judge each other by their inner moral characters, proof
had to be made by resort to external signs.
Id. at 1196. See also Cammack, supra note 205, at 410-15.
272. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1194.
273. Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 129 (1996).
274. See WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS,
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 131-32 (2002) (quoting
Enlightenment philosopher David Hume that the jury is “an institution admirable in itself, and the
best calculated for the preservation of liberty and the administration of justice, that was ever
devised by the wit of man”).
275. Hunter, supra note 273, at 129.
276. Id. “[T]he rules of evidence clearly embody Enlightenment epistemology. They
privilege fact over value, reason over emotion, presence over absence, physical over
psychological, perception over intuition.” Id. For a general discussion of the development of the
rules of evidence, see LANGBEIN, supra note 156, at 178-251.
277. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1195.
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the development of the modern, “enlightened” trial.278 Precluding the very
evidence that formed the basis of verdicts prior to the Enlightenment reflects
the impact of the rejection of virtue ethics and the completeness of the
adoption of these ideas in the common law, both British and American.
It is not surprising that during this period, juries underwent a profound
change. Prior to the 1660s, jurors could be required to return verdicts for the
Crown.279 In fact, the Star Chamber was often used to prosecute and punish
jurors who failed to return verdicts favorable to the Crown.280 Because the
Crown was the agent of God, the juror simply followed the word of God, in a
similar fashion to the way that knowledge in general was conveyed and
understood. After the Reformation and the rise of modern science and secular
knowledge, individuals no longer needed intermediaries to understand or
interpret information. Individuals were able to use their own experience and
intelligence to determine their relationship to God, to the world, and to
knowledge. Not surprisingly, these changes were reflected in the way juries
functioned. In 1670, the courts officially recognized the right of jurors to act
independently and to use their own judgment and intelligence in reaching a
verdict.281 In Bushell’s Case, the court eloquently expressed the extent to
which the impact of the Reformation and the scientific movement had
influenced jury trials:
To what end must [jurors] undergo the heavy punishment of the villainous
judgment, if after all this they implicitly must give a verdict by the dictates and
authority of another man, under pain of fines and imprisonment, when sworn
to do it according to the best of their own knowledge? A man cannot see by
another’s eye, nor hear by another’s ear, no more can a man conclude or infer
the thing to be resolved by another’s understanding or reasoning.282

At the same time that jurors were free to act with independent judgment,
the character evidence rule developed to keep a particular type of evidence
from jurors. While at first glance contradictory, this development is consistent
with the liberal principles being developed during the end of the seventeenth
and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries.
Liberalism, particularly in America, came to be synonymous with personal
autonomy and procedural fairness.283 Personal autonomy is consistent with the
concept of individual freedom in the exercise of rights guaranteed to the

278. Id. See also 1 WIGMORE, supra note 128, § 194, at 415-16.
279. CLAY CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 22 (1998).
280. Id. at 21.
281. Bushell’s Case, 6 Howell’s State Trials 999 (1670). For an account of Bushell’s Case
and the growth of juror independence, see DWYER, supra note 274, at 43-59.
282. Bushell’s Case, 6 Howell’s State Trials at 1012.
283. Goldfarb, supra note 67, at 34-35.
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individual by the state.284 It is possible to view personal autonomy as a private
realm shielded from intrusion by the state within which the individual is free to
make choices about how to live. Procedural fairness, on the other hand, is
more focused on the interaction of the individual with the state; in other words,
with the public actions of the individual in relation to the shared rules of
cooperation enforced by the state.285 Liberalism’s concern with both personal
autonomy and procedural fairness can also be expressed as the creation of a
public-private dichotomy.286
With regard to procedural fairness, the resolution of public disputes is of
primary concern.287 A public dispute is one involving the individual and the
government or a breach of the social order. The resolution of public disputes is
critical to regulating interactions between individuals and in preserving the
realms of personal autonomy. It is due to the unique nature of American
liberal society that nearly all disputes of public importance are resolved in
court, usually by means of a trial. The trial is one of the main vehicles by
which liberalism is manifest in the legal arena; it is the means by which
American society determines mens rea and the objective failure to live up to
the requirements of social cooperation. Consistent with the definition of
liberalism discussed above, the trial must not advance a particular conception
of the good; rather, the trial must be a forum for formal decision-making
regulated by rules that ensure the neutrality of the forum in its determination of
the facts.

284. Id. at 34.
285. McClain, supra note 189, at 1205.
286. While the concept of privacy implicit in such a public-private dichotomy did not fully
develop until later in the nineteenth century, it is possible to see the seeds of this public-private
dichotomy even at the birth of liberalism. For this reason, I have elected to articulate the division
at this point as a public-private dichotomy. In addition, it is important to recognize that the
public-private dichotomy inherent in liberalism is related to, but distinct from, the public-private
dichotomy discussed earlier in connection with the legal system’s reflection of the societal
privacy discourse in the mid-nineteenth century. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
Liberalism distinguishes between spheres of public concern – our actions that affect others – and
spheres of private action – those actions over which we should have autonomous control and in
which our liberty is guaranteed. In the privacy discourse, the private sphere is more limited than
that in liberalism generally. In the privacy discourse, the private sphere relates to that portion of
our autonomy specifically connected to family life. It is important to keep these concepts clear,
therefore, I have attempted to be specific with regard to the context in which the term “publicprivate dichotomy” has been used. At the same time, because domestic violence overlaps both
concepts of privacy, it is useful to make the connection between liberalism’s public-private
dichotomy and the privacy discourse’s public-private dichotomy.
287. See MACINTYRE, supra note 236, at 157. “Disputes between men have no impartial
arbiter to decide them, and every dispute will therefore tend toward a state of war between the
parties. All these considerations make desirable the handing over of authority to a civil power in
who trust can be reposed.” Id.
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To ensure the neutrality of the forum, the rules must preserve two separate
aspects of neutrality. First, the rules must protect the procedural neutrality of
the forum by eliminating improper advantage based on influence, status, or
standing. Second, the rules must ensure the evidentiary neutrality of the
forum. This second aspect is primarily achieved through the exercise of the
rules of evidence that regulate the types of evidence deemed appropriate for
substantive decision making. The rules of evidence, therefore, are essential to
the public aspect of liberalism: they regulate a formal and reasonable decision
making process which seeks, so far as possible, a substantively just result.
As a subset of the evidence rules, the character evidence rule advances the
liberal conception of procedural fairness through the preservation of
evidentiary neutrality. However, it also embodies an additional component of
liberalism. The rule mimics the public-private dichotomy inherent in
liberalism; it reflects the liberal belief that what is done in the private realm of
personal autonomy is not relevant to the public sphere. The rule not only
regulates formal decision-making, it reinforces the essence of liberalism:
freedom of individual choice to be the sort of person one wants to be, limited
by the objective terms of cooperation.
The notion that people should be judged by their public actions and not
their private character is quintessentially American, quintessentially
Enlightenment, and quintessentially American liberalism:
The trial can and should be a model for formal decision making. The types of
evidence we find acceptable in that setting should represent our highest, not
our lowest, instincts about how we ought to behave. If we believe that we
should avoid making decisions based on character, then the trial process should
reinforce that belief through regulation of character evidence.288

The trial reflects liberalism’s belief that a fair set of procedures will result in a
fair determination: justice. Excluding character evidence reflects the notion
that character evidence will pervert the procedures in the trial. It also reflects a
belief that the private realm is not relevant to the resolution of public disputes.
Under this theory, the character evidence rule is critical to creating and
preserving a fair procedure for formal decision making.
E.

A New Rule Is Consistent with Intellectual Foundations of Rule

In the domestic violence context, the character evidence rule, however,
violates its intellectual foundations, and therefore, the rule’s legitimate
purposes. The rule rejects Enlightenment and scientific principles and violates
the essence of liberalism by advancing a particular conception of the good. An

288. Leonard, supra note 141, at 1192-93.
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examination of these violations compels a new rule true to the principles
underlying the original rule.
1. Traditional Policy Arguments Are Unpersuasive
The traditional policy arguments in favor of the character evidence rule are
not persuasive in the context of a modern domestic violence trial.289 The
concern over unfair surprise has largely been addressed by procedural rules
requiring notice of the charges and pre-trial recitation of all prior bad act
evidence.290 The claim that a person will have to defend against his whole life
is exaggerated. The defendant is aware of his past and aware that the only
relevant portion of his past is that which relates to violence against women.
Because the prosecution is limited in its knowledge of the defendant’s private
life, its main source of information comes from prior police reports and from
the victim. Prior police reports are readily accessible to both the prosecution
and the defense. The victim is generally subjected to a grueling interview with
the defense prior to trial, during which the defense is free to investigate prior
instances of violence of which the victim knows. In addition, the prosecution
is under a continuing duty to provide pre-trial discovery and therefore must
inform the defense of any acts of misconduct which the prosecution intends to
present.291 Finally, the question of whether a prior bad act is admissible can be
established pre-trial. The concept of unfair surprise does not exist in the
typical domestic violence trial today.

289. It is interesting to compare the domestic violence context with the sexual assault context.
Congress rejected the traditional policy arguments when it enacted rules admitting prior
misconduct in sexual assault and child molestation cases. See FED. R. EVID. 413-15. There is
much scholarly work which supports the rejection of the traditional policy arguments in the
sexual assault and child molestation contexts. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other
Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 565 (1994) (rejecting unfair
surprise); De Sanctis, supra note 8, at 387 (rejecting confusion of the issues); Fingar, supra note
141, at 537-38 (rejecting undue prejudice); Karp, supra note 141, at 21-22. In addition, several
scholars also argue that the federal rules admitting character evidence in sexual assault and child
molestation cases have procedural benefits. See id. at 21. See also De Sanctis, supra note 8, at
393 (asserting that the bright line rules presented by FED. R. EVID. 413-14 save preparation time
by attorneys for both the prosecution and the defense, as well as saving judges countless hours in
determining whether prior acts meet sufficient tests to allow admission under exceptions to the
common law character evidence rule); Fingar, supra note 141, at 542. It can be argued that the
rationale for a rule change in the domestic violence context is even greater than in the sexual
assault context because of the repetitive nature of domestic violence within a single relationship.
290. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (requiring “reasonable notice in advance of trial”); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 12(b)(3)(c) (requiring pre-trial motion to suppress evidence); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (requiring
production of witness statements for pre-trial motion to suppress). In addition, this concern has
been rejected in the sexual assault context. See supra note 289.
291. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c) (prosecution’s continuing duty to disclose).
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The concerns over undue prejudice and confusion of the issues are also
largely addressed by the availability of pre-trial determinations and the
interaction of FRE 404 and FRE 403.292 Prior to any character evidence
getting before a jury, the judge has to determine that the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. During the
pre-trial hearing, all of the character evidence is discussed, and the parties
argue its relevance, prejudicial nature, and probative value. In addition,
restrictions on the evidence that will be admitted are fully argued and
established long before the jury sees or hears the evidence.
While a pre-trial hearing and a judicial determination go a long way to
undermining the assertion of undue prejudice and confusion of the issues, there
is no question that juries may misuse evidence. There is also no question that a
jury feels more comfortable and confident in its decision of guilt when they are
aware of a past history of violence. Of course, the converse is also true.
Without a past history, juries are apt to discount the allegations and consider
the victim not credible. Without a past history, juries will only see the bad acts
of the victim in isolation. Given this fact, it seems disingenuous to act as if the
trial is not about character. What the trial is not about is the character of the
defendant.293
2. The Current Rule Never Contemplated Domestic Violence
As detailed above, the character evidence ban was well established in the
American common law before the American Revolution. Domestic violence
has been expressly or tacitly sanctioned since the formation of the United
States. The character evidence rule, therefore, was established at a time when
the legal position of women was subordinate to men, and it was legal for a
husband to beat his wife.
Overlapping the history of the character evidence rule with the history of
domestic violence highlights several significant issues and calls into question
the continued validity of the character evidence rule in the domestic violence
context. The character evidence rule developed to deal with specific sets of
problems relating to character and the effort to achieve fair trials and just
verdicts. Because domestic violence was not a crime, the unique issues
292. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded it its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.”
293. Alaska, Colorado, Minnesota, and California have adopted evidence rules which admit
prior acts of domestic violence in the current prosecution. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4)
(2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-801.5(2) (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.20 (2001); and
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109(a)(1) (1999). As with the changes in the federal sexual assault arena,
no scholarly work identifies great injustices that have resulted from these changes.
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surrounding domestic violence were not considered in the set of problems that
the character evidence rule was developed to address. 294 The character
evidence rule should, therefore, reflect changed understandings.295
3. The Current Rule Violates Liberal Theory
The character evidence rule embodies liberalism’s concern with the
preservation of personal autonomy and the neutrality of formal decisionmaking. In the domestic violence context, however, the character evidence
ban subverts its liberal principles and distorts the neutral process into one that
advances a particular conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine.296
In a non-domestic violence case, the character evidence rule can be
supported by arguments not derived from a comprehensive doctrine. The rule
applies equally to all and advances the belief that character evidence is not
relevant to a determination of our public actions.297 When accused of a crime,
being judged by our actions and not by our character does not seem to foster a
particular conception of the good or a religious viewpoint. 298 Rather, the rule
assists in the discovery of truth by preserving a fair and neutral dispute
resolution forum, primarily through the regulation of evidence deemed to be
prejudicial to the issues. In the non-domestic violence context, the character
evidence rule furthers its liberal principles.
In the specific context of domestic violence, however, the arguments in
favor of the rule are made from a comprehensive doctrine that promotes the
subordinate position of women. This violates a central tenet of liberalism that
the state cannot encourage a comprehensive doctrine or a particular conception
of the good. The character evidence rule profoundly disadvantages women.

294. Seymore, supra note 23, at 1035.
295. In light of the history of domestic violence, commentators’ reliance on the longevity of
the character evidence rule as support for the rule’s continued existence is questionable. See
generally Leonard supra note 141.
296. I borrow the term “comprehensive doctrine” from John Rawls. Rawls defines a doctrine
as “comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of
personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships,
and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.” RAWLS,
supra note 187, at 13, 175.
297. According to Rawls, justice can only be achieved when state policies – i.e. judicial
decisions – are not based on a comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines. Id. at 223.
298. It is interesting to note that Leonard, supra note 141, makes several arguments for the
continued existence of the character evidence rules, in the general context, expressly relying on
comprehensive doctrines. He states that the rule embodies the Jewish principle of loshan hora
(literally, evil tongue). Id. at 1188, 1190-91. Later, Leonard discusses the Protestant basis for the
rule. Id. at 1196-99. These arguments would violate liberalism’s prohibition against
comprehensive doctrines.
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Women comprise the overwhelming majority of domestic violence victims.299
For these women, the rule prevents discussion of their realities and allows male
defendants to hide behind half-truths of good character. Male defendants are
allowed to define the relationship and – through the character evidence rule –
are permitted to employ and profit from societal stereotypes about women in
general and domestic violence victims in particular. This distorts the trial and
subverts liberalism’s goal of preserving evidentiary neutrality.
The character evidence rule also plays a significant role in preserving the
private sphere which perpetuates the subordinate legal and cultural status of
women. As discussed earlier, the private sphere has been primary in
perpetuating male domestic violence against women. This is state sanctioned
violation of women’s personal autonomy. Whether supported by secular or
religious beliefs, the comprehensive doctrine of patriarchy underlies the
character evidence rule.300
When the rule was originally adopted, the subordinate status of women
meant that the underpinnings of the rule were ones that a person could
reasonably expect others to embrace.301 That is no longer the case. It is
inconceivable that a person could reasonably expect others to embrace a rule
that treats women as subordinate, that hides the true nature of domestic
violence, that so disproportionately advantages men, that perpetuates violence
against women, and that allows juries to base their decisions on biases,
falsehoods, and stereotypes. It is not reasonable to assume that others would
accept these arguments in favor of the continued existence of the character
evidence rules in the domestic violence context.302
4. The Current Rule Violates Enlightenment and Scientific Principles
In the domestic violence context, the current rule violates the principles of
the Enlightenment and the scientific movement. As discussed above, the
Enlightenment and the scientific movement constituted rejections of virtue
ethics and religious superstition. Rather than focusing on the character of
individuals as birthrights and authorized epistemologies, the Enlightenment

299. Rice, supra note 4, at 939-40.
300. For a general discussion of patriarchy and liberalism, see Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a
Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 389-92 (2003); Schneider,
Equal Rights, supra note 2, at 628. For a general discussion of patriarchy and its historical roots,
see GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986).
301. See RAWLS, supra note 187, at 243. Rawls defines a legitimate governmental policy as
one that “all might reasonably be expected to endorse.” Id.
302. Id. at 226. “There is no reason why any citizen, or association of citizens, should have
the right to use state power to decide constitutional essentials as that person’s, or that
association’s, comprehensive doctrine directs. When equally represented, no citizen could grant
to another person or association that political power.” Id.
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and the scientific movement emphasized individual reason and freedom of
conscience: individuals can employ their own reason to discern the objective
truth about an action.303
The character evidence rule represents an acceptance of the Enlightenment
insight that a person’s private character is irrelevant in assessing a person’s
public actions. This public-private dichotomy was critical to the establishment
of the modern jury trial and American rejection of a status-based society.
Many people would view these developments as significant advances in the
history of humanity, especially as they paved the way for democratic
governance with all the accompanying principles of liberalism: liberty;
equality; privacy; and freedom of religion, thought, and speech.304 These
changes reflected the Enlightenment belief in the essential goodness of persons
and of the need for increased equality between persons.
The character evidence rule also reflects an acceptance of objective
evidence of actions. It incorporates a fundamental insight of the scientific
movement that the meaning of an action is contingent upon understanding the
context surrounding the action. Observation, experience, and experiment are
all geared toward placing an action in context. After the rise of modern
science and the Enlightenment, an individual did not need to rely on a higher
power to determine the importance of an action.
In the non-domestic violence context, the character evidence rule’s
extension of the public-private dichotomy furthers greater equality and
egalitarianism. The rule reduces aspects of social status or advantage from
influencing the jury’s determination. The rule advances the notion that all are
equal regardless of birth or social status. It also furthers scientific principles in
that the rule removes from the jury’s consideration evidence not connected to
the act or its context. In this way, the character evidence rule advances its
underlying principles.
In the domestic violence context, however, the rule violates its underlying
principles and fails to serve its objective evidence role. First, the character
evidence rule systematically misrepresents the equal importance of the
interests of one group (women) over another (men). Rather than advancing
Enlightenment principles of egalitarianism, the rule perpetuates the subordinate
position of women. The character evidence rule perpetuates the public-private
dichotomy, preserves a private realm of violence against women, and shields
that private violence from public scrutiny. In the domestic violence context,
therefore, the character evidence rule works to perpetuate greater subjugation
rather than less.

303. Jackson & Doran, supra note 226, at 172.
304. Goldfarb, supra note 67, at 39.
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Second, the character evidence rule isolates an act of domestic violence
from the context of the violent relationship. This is contrary to current
understanding of battering relationships as a pattern of behavior and not a
series of isolated incidents. As discussed earlier, viewing an act separated
from its context changes the meaning of the act for both the victim and the
jury. Denying a juror’s ability to place the violent act into its proper and full
context prevents the juror from employing the scientific principles that formed
the character evidence rule. Essentially, the juror is prevented from using her
own reason and experience to make an objective assessment of the defendant’s
action. The use of the character evidence rule, therefore, violates this
understanding of the scientific movement.
The character evidence rule runs counter to a second aspect of the
underlying scientific principles that helped to form the rule: discovery builds
bridges to further discovery. In the past fifty years, much has been discovered
about psychology and behavioral traits which pertain to batterers.305 The
character evidence rule bars the use of this evidence in the domestic violence
context, preventing the jury from benefiting from these scientific
advancements.
It is important to recognize that the rejection of the character evidence rule
in the domestic violence context does not equate with a return to a focus on
character. The defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence are not character,
they are context. Consistent with modern conceptions of battering
relationships, the prior acts are simply part of the pattern, not isolated
incidents. The jury will have to assess the entire pattern, not simply the
isolated charged incident. The function of the jury will still be the assessment
of objective actions. The focus of the trial remains on the objective actions of
the defendant, not on whether the defendant is a good person or a bad person.
Jurors have the ability to determine objective actions even when confronted
with evidence of prior misconduct. As has been discussed, juries have
historically been presented with evidence of the domestic violence victim’s

305. See Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 533 (1991).
“[T]he view that character evidence in general is not probative of conduct can no longer
draw support from the psychology materials. Where the prior behavior or a character trait
is described with sufficient particularity and where it occurred in an analogous context, it
may be highly probative of the conduct in question. At the same time, the psychological
literature does not indicate that character evidence is unduly prejudicial. Although misuse
of character evidence admitted for limited purposes is probably inevitable, the notion that
jurors overvalue the probativeness of character or make errors because of their inability to
make accurate assessments of character gains little reinforcement from contemporary
work in the social sciences.”
Id.
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“character.” The addition of admission of prior acts of the defendant may add
to the jury’s task but not substantially alter it.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal system should be wary of changes to established principles that
have stood the test of time. The character evidence rule has existed for
centuries, and the general purpose of the rule remains valid. A call to alter the
character evidence rule should be cautiously and carefully considered.
In general, the character evidence rule promotes neutral dispute resolution,
encourages greater egalitarianism, rejects the importance of social status, and
fosters adherence to scientific principles. In the domestic violence context,
however, the rule fails to achieve these aspirations. Rather, the rule violates
important aspects of its intellectual foundation: liberalism, the Enlightenment,
and the scientific movement. In the domestic violence context, the character
evidence rule subjugates women, promotes societal stereotypes of women,
perpetuates domestic violence against women, and sanctions that same
violence. Until the character evidence rule is changed in domestic violence
prosecutions, the law will continue to tacitly condone domestic violence.
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